A Pattern for Joint Operations: World War II Close Air Support, North Africa
Requirements for War with the Axis
Enunciating principles of close air support in April 1940 did not address the complex details and problems of joint air-ground cooperation. The success of Germany's combined arms--first in Poland, then in Western Europe during the spring of 1940--encouraged Congress to support further air force expansion and reorganization and a reevaluation of tactical doctrine. A force in being needed more specific procedures for joint operations than were outlined in FM 1-5. Marshall directed Andrews and his G-3 staff to study the issue anew. In September Andrews issued a memorandum that listed five kinds of air support for ground forces: close air support, air defense of friendly forces and installations, rear area attack , paratroop support, and reconnaissance services. Andrews recommended joint air-ground tests to evaluate the concepts, especially the first two, which required the greatest effort in coordination. After a struggle over timing of exercises, Marshall directed Lt. Gen. Lesley J. McNair, chief of staff of GHQ (a commander's headquarters for all field forces), to conduct a series of exercises.
From 1941 to 1944, as commander of CHQ and Army Ground Forces, McNair was responsible, with Arnold, for joint development of air support, tactical training and doctrine. McNair organized exercises that brought together various air and ground units to experiment with timing and innovative team combinations. More than other Army training or operations officers, he promoted teamwork and cooperation. More than most, he patiently suffered through the continuing teething problems generated by the joining together of the different combat arms. He criticized self-serving attitudes from the air and ground branches. He was especially disturbed by the air force tendency towards independence. He repudiated the view of some air officers that the air arm could win a war by itself, thereby justifying independence. He also opposed division commanders who demanded control of their own air resources, and he relentlessly endorsed the unity-of -command principle.18
Marshall also advocated consistently the elementary Army concept that unity of command was paramount for success in battle. Lessons of war suggested to him the need for a unified command structure. He remarked that the German victories in Poland and the Low Countries were founded on "creation of a single high military command for all forces, whether of the land, sea or the air. . . . In fact the key to the military success of Germany in the present war has not been the operation of the air forces on a n independent basis but rather the subordination of air power to the supreme command of the armed forces. . . ." 19
Arnold believed that strategic bombardment should be a primary ingredient in the battle with the Axis powers, but he too espoused unity of command, although perhaps never with the fervor of a potential field or theater commander, such as McNair and Marshall, and certainly with a different definition of centralized command in the separate arms. Arnold made persistent effort to satisfy ground force complaints and solve air support problems. As with Marshall and other commanding officers, he had many essential tasks to perform, and close air support was only one of the air facets that crossed his desk. One example of his concern occurred in 1941, when the Army Air Forces was created to give the air forces greater autonomy. Against the advice of staff members, Arnold designated, for the first time in air arm history, a formal advocate for air support. Col. William E. Lynd became the first head of the Air Support Section of the Air Force Combat Command (successor to the GHQ Air Force in June 1941). He could focus attention towards the air-ground team when most needed, just as the rising expectations for war and emphasis in air matters turned towards strategic air warfare.20
With the dramatic force expansion in 1941 and reorganizations necessary to improve command and control, Arnold identified a distinct organization for air support. In the new organization the Army Air Forces copied the British idea of numbered air forces "on a Theater of Operations principle," to provide higher- echelon leadership. These air forces would contain specific types of commands, such as bomber commands and fighter commands. The command organization reflected the hope that placing aircraft types together would simplify training, maintenance, and logistics.
The new organization included "air support commands" to "secure the closest type of cooperation with the ground forces."21 Initially, the air support commands were filled only with air units providing battlefield observation services. Later, in 1942, fighters, dive bombers, and medium and light bombers were placed under the air support command structure to improve air support capability. At GHQ McNair accepted the principles of flexibility and massing of forces, which the air forces stressed; but, with the emergence of mechanized warfare, he worried about specialization in the air and ground arms. He felt that the inclusion of different types of aircraft, as well as the variable unit combinations, added to command confusion.22 For a number of months McNair was unhappy with formation of the air support commands, which he declared was "one more step in the separation of the air from the rest of the Army."23
Lt. Gen. D. C. Emmons, commander of Air Force Combat Command, felt otherwise. He envisioned an air-ground section of a proposed air support command headquarters being physically located with McNair at GHQ. In addition, he proposed that cooperation would be enhanced by locating subordinate air support commands "at airdromes nearest to the headquarters of the forces with which they will work."24 Further study by the General Staff and the Air Council* confirmed that this organization, with its staff and command, was suitable to overcome the reservations of the ground forces. McNair and air staff officers also agreed that air support service entailed more than just air support command operations and that "all classes of combat aviation of the Army Air Forces must be trained and indoctrinated in performance of the Air Force mission, and in support of the ground and naval forces."25 The directive that approved the air support commands stated that not only would all aircraft types and units "be trained and used in the support of ground forces" but that units organic to the air support commands would not "constitute the sole air support of the ground operations."26
While the War Department expected the reorganization of the Army Air Forces to improve air-ground cooperation, events pointed to a reduced potential for the close air support facet of air support. In the fall of 1941 the War Department transferred some aviation observation and liaison units and their functions to the operational control of field artillery commands. Only procurement and major maintenance of these units were kept under Army Air Forces responsibility. Not only would the Army Air Forces be less involved in the close air support aspect by transfer of observation units to artillery, but reports from Europe encouraged the Army Air Forces to begin allocating fast fighters and bombers to observation units that they still controlled. The faster aircraft suggested less capability for covering the small-scale, individualized target assignments requested by the ground commanders.
Organization of the theater-echelon air forces--the Twelfth Air Force as an example--and their wide variety of air missions presented a probability of reduced close air support capability. All types of combat commands and all major combat types of aircraft were included in these numbered air forces. How the increased importance of the theater echelon diminished prospects for close air support can be illustrated by Marshall% air policy statement in 1941. In his list of "Basic Principles of Employment of the Air Component of the Army in the Order of Their Priority" close air support ranked fifth in priority out of seven potential missions. Interdiction of enemy armies and air forces, air superiority, and attack on enemy shipping had higher priorities than "close cooperation with other arms of the mobile army. . . . "27 While Marshall's statement was made with reference to Western Hemisphere defense thinking, the turn to European war planning did not necessarily signify a change in the falling priority of close air support.28
Battlefield commanders faced a situation where their supporting air resources were controlled at a higher-echelon command that had different priorities. Control of most air units in a theater was projected as the domain of the theater commanders. This included transports for dropping paratroopers and supplies; observation aircraft to provide theater observation, reconnaissance, and liaison; and the combat bombers and fighters to attack enemy aviation, troop centers, and communication choke points, as well as enemy troops on the immediate front of the ground forces. This left only the air support commands, of uncertain constitution in 1941-42, to be controlled by battlefield c0mmanders.29
Air and ground leaders were uneasy at this division of air force resources. For example, the assistant air chief of staff for plans, Brig. Gen. Orvil Anderson, spoke for several leading airmen who felt that any division of the limited and valued air resources weakened the military principle of mass employment. Ground commanders in training argued for larger relative allocation of resources for the air support commands. Now--and throughout the war--Army field commanders and staff officers, in training and combat, complained that the Army Air Forces failed to provide adequate support aircraft.30
Testing of these concepts during the series of War Department maneuvers in 1941 was hurt by a shortfall of aircraft and trained squadrons. The maneuver planners, air-ground coordinators, and troop commanders were frustrated when the Army Air Forces did not provide adequate numbers of aircraft for practical testing of air support coordination. McNair also noted that the ground forces failed to employ the limited number of available aircraft realistically. Arnold explained that diverting squadrons from training to the maneuvers would seriously delay training schedules. Ground force planners were not conscious of the requirements of a year-long training program, just for basic pilot instruction. Marshall sided with Arnold but ordered him to compromise and strip some aircraft and personnel from training squadrons. The exercises became more complex through the summer and fall, but ultimately no one was satisfied with the artificiality of aircraft employment, even in the important Louisiana and Carolina maneuvers in late 1941.31
As exercise director, McNair now appreciated the necessity for the air and ground forces to emphasize basic instructions within their respective branches in the months ahead. He accepted the idea that pilots had to learn to fly and shoot before training with the ground troops. In December 1941 he and Arnold proposed another series of maneuvers for 1942 to exercise the joint air-ground relationship. The declaration of war abruptly curtailed these plans, as well as many other plans for a smooth buildup of forces.
Air support command structure and concepts for close air support were seriously disrupted throughout 1942.32 Arnold noted in mid-February that close air support units "are still wallowing around looking for someone who takes a n interest in them and in their activities."33 Even as late as September, when large numbers of forces were committed to combat, Maj. Gen. Jacob L. Devers, commander of armored forces, told Arnold that there was no air-ground support training: "We are simply puttering. Cannot something be done about it?"34
By late 1942, as operations captured more firmly the attention of air and ground staff planners and field commanders, a number of problems affected the quality and quantity of air support. Roosevelt showed his support of the Allies by calling for production of large quantities of American aircraft, thereby constricting the flow of airplanes available to air force commands. With war declared, air units were hurriedly concentrated and rearranged. Operational necessities decimated air support and air cooperation demonstration units. For example, the Army Air Forces disbanded the Third Air Support Command to help fill the needs of the newly formed Eighth Air Force to be based in England. The Army Air Forces eliminated the Fifth Air Support Command and redesignated it the Ninth Air Force in April 1942. The War Department removed two of the four air support commands from training and put them into coastal patrol duties to help combat the German submarine offensive against the East and Gulf Coasts.
Marshall, responding to organizational inadequacies revealed by the time of Pearl Harbor, reorganized the General Staff in March 1942. General Headquarters became Army Ground Forces, and both the Army Ground Forces and Army Air Forces gained greater independence of action. The reorganization also raised the level of suspicion between air and ground officers. Ground officers knew that the air force officers eyed jealously the British model for air-ground support. In the Royal Air Force the air units were not attached to ground commanders at any level. The air commander made the decisions on use of air support resources.
Air and ground leaders were also at odds over the air force insistence on training bomber units in strategic and interdiction bombing techniques before training them to support the ground forces. As a result, the Army Air Forces then declared that with time running short, fighter and medium bomber pilots would not receive army support training. The ground arms commands were also suspicious of the name changes given to air units designated to provide close air support (ground- air support command, ground support command, air support command). In turn, some ground commanders asked for the formation of a dedicated ground support air force, fearing that support would not come any other way. In spite of their felt needs, this request suggested a lack of appreciation for the complexities of air operations. It also went in the face of a principle held by some of the staff in Washington that modern ground force units should be more flexible and less encumbered with responsibilities, such as managing air unit operations.35
The air forces modified the types of aircraft assigned air support units several times in 1942, adding light bombers and then dive bombers, medium bombers and fighters, giving the ground commander potential access to better ground attack resources. But the problem of giving ground troops realistic air support training continued through the remainder of 1942. In reality, there simply were not enough bases, aircraft, or time as the demands of war overrode expectations of proper training. Even the air representatives at the growing number of ground force schools and training facilities complained about poor air support training exercises because of a deficiency in aircraft numbers.
McNair showed an appreciation of this dilemma, accepting the shortage problem with aircraft and pilots. Arnold agreed that "priority commitments, special diversions, and restricted flow of aircraft to Army Air Forces have prevented [the] fullest desirable allocation of combat aviation for . . . Ground-Air Support training."36 Somewhat optimistically, Arnold and McNair saw improvements for 1943, but American forces were committed without realistic air-ground training during the confused buildup subsequent to the invasion of North Africa.37
Many changes in Army aviation between mid-1940 and mid-1942 affected close air support. Most important was acquisition of a strategic mission to bomb a potential enemy's war-making industry that encouraged greater control of air resources by airmen. A reorganization of air units into air forces similar to European air force models not only precipitated greater centralized control by airmen but also divided attention originally given to close air support and other ground support matters. The airmen compensated by organizing both special air support commands to consolidate units providing close air support for the ground forces and by forming a headquarters staff office dedicated to air support and relations between air and ground arms. Air and ground leaders discussed the meshing of forces in a potential European war scenario and the War Department held exercises to test new theories. With time at a premium in 1942, subsequent to the buildup of forces for operations, the War Department could not insist on realistic air-ground training even if there was a great need for better understanding between air and ground forces.
