A Pattern for Joint Operations: World War II Close Air Support, North Africa

Aircraft: Enabling the Execution of Close Air Support

The War Department tackled one other major problem between air and ground, choosing and procuring suitable close air support aircraft, in the prewar period. Limited funding reduced research and development in the interwar years. Then, in 1939, when war preparations opened the purse, the need for operational aircraft was too urgent to start the acquisition process at the basic research level. Lacking many modern aircraft in 1939, the Air Corps now scurried to procure the latest models of all available types. I t was forced to rely on the self-initiated design of the aircraft manufacturers. Fortunately, the American aviation industry had been competitive internationally and had done design work on many up-to-date aircraft. The American commercial market and the foreign military market had encouraged research for several years prior to 1939. In particular, the American industries developed radial engines superior to any of European design, and had built superior transport aircraft. In the late thirties, with relatively short development time, the industry modified many of its  transport aircraft into light and medium bombers and offered them to foreign and American military organizations.⁴⁴

Design and development of new bombers was one thing; aviation technology was such that engineers could readily produce bigger and faster aircraft. However, aircraft for close support, particularly observation and attack types, had operational requirements that called for characteristics more difficult to produce than size and speed. Aviation engineers in the United States and in foreign countries had failed to find the technology to match those characteristics, and all observation and attack aircraft between 1939 and 1943, American and foreign, were considered obsolete. For aviation technologists, the air battles of 1939 and 1940 in Europe demonstrated that the very latest Air Corps attack and observation models were excessively vulnerable to the speed and guns of fighters and to general ground fire. German light flak (antiaircraft) guns proved so effective that the interwar approach of sneaking into a ground target, flying low and slow between ground obstructions, was no longer possible. In short, the prospect seemed dim for development of a n effective weapons-carrying attack plane or observation model for close air support.

Faced with the five-year timelag between design and construction, Arnold was forced to make an important procurement decision in 1939. He started a revolution in attack bombardment doctrine in choosing the Douglas A-20, one of many new light bomber designs offered by the manufacturers, over the more simple, traditional, single engine attack aircraft that could hit small targets identified by the ground commanders. His decision demonstrated the growing popularity of light bomber procurement by European air forces in the immediate months before the invasion of Poland. In doing so, Arnold assumed that the new, larger-sized medium bombers, offered by manufacturers without Air Corps request, might also prove useful for close air support. He expected that these new twin-engined bombers would be fast enough and sufficiently armed to match enemy fighters and that the remarkable speed provided by the new powerful engines would allow aircraft to slip through antiaircraft defenses. Ground force proponents feared that the new bombers were more suited to interdiction bombing and that they would not be capable of hitting targets in close proximity to friendly troops. Maj. Gen. Innis P. Swift, commander of the 1st Cavalry Division in 1942, forwarded a design proposal that was symbolic of the dream of all ground commanders. The proposed aircraft matched all the needs of a weapons-carrying ground support aircraft: long loitering capability, armor protection against ground weapons, and ability to carry a suitable number of weapons and munitions. General Swift understood, however, that success hung on the hope that engineers could develop an engine with suitable horsepower. The Army Air Forces engineers put out bids for such an aircraft, but a prototype was not found until after the war. 

Procuring aircraft for the observation role was a more difficult problem than procuring weapons-carrying aircraft, and resulted in years of wrangling between air and ground staff and field proponents. Faced with the problem of the new, fast enemy fighters and the requirement to maintain long loitering capabilities, aircraft designers had an almost impossible technological task. The airmen rejected many designs proposals offered by manufacturers. All proposals compromised speed and defenses, even though most models would have provided good observation platforms in peacetime. Somewhat selfishly, many ground officers felt that observation problems stemmed from the airmen's self-serving concentration on bomber development and that aircraft for close air support observation needs had been neglected.⁴⁵

After months of argument over several types of observation aircraft, in 1941 the ground force planners demanded that a small, lightweight, off-the-shelf, commercial model be procured for battlefield observation duties. The 1941 maneuvers had shown the utility of small aircraft to ground commanders. Some ground officers maintained that the little "Grasshoppers" would be able to observe enemy activities while staying behind friendly lines in their flights. This way they would avoid enemy ground fire. Supporters in the ground forces also believed that the planes' maneuverability would allow them to dodge fighter pursuit. The airmen never fully accepted the light aircraft as a battlefield weapon, but they saw no alternative. Some "standard" observation models, such as the 0-47 and 0-52 procured for testing between 1939 and 1941, were very fine aircraft in terms of providing good loitering time and good observation for the observers. Yet by 1941 the airmen had determined that they were too vulnerable, by European battlefield standards, both to enemy fighters and ground fire. Instead, the airmen suggested that deep penetration reconnaissance could be carried out by specially modified fighters o r fast bombers, and the small planes would be procured until they could find a better close-in observation aircraft. ⁴⁶ 

Understanding many of the problems associated with acquiring suitable close air support aircraft, and usually deferring to the airmen specialists, Marshall in one instance interfered with an Army Air Forces decision. In 1941 he asked the air forces to acquire dive bombers similar to those used by the Germans. The Stuka dive bombers had terrified enemy ground forces by providing precision bombardment of targets close to German troops. Light bombers, using the level-bombing attack mode, could not guarantee pinpoint target destruction. The German dive bomber success captured everyone's attention, and army commanders wanted similar air support. Many argued that this was the only remaining aircraft type that gave field commanders hope for effective weapons-carrying close air support aircraft .⁴⁷

Arnold told Marshall that the Air Corps had tested the dive bomber concept years earlier, rejecting it as dangerous and potentially ineffective because of enemy fighters. He also told Marshall that German dive bombers had been proven too vulnerable in battle, in spite of some success against Poland, France, and the Soviet Union. The Germans had, in fact, comprehended the weakness of the type and did not intend to employ the dive bombers in theaters where their enemy had first-line fighters. Nonetheless, probably overly sensitive to the complaints of ground forces and wanting to provide a surrogate, Marshall insisted. Arnold complied by ordering the acquisition of dive bombers for the air support commands. Because the Army Air Forces had neither dive bombers nor any in design, the air staff ordered quantities of modified Navy models and had the first production P-51 fighters modified with dive brakes and wing racks to fill the requirement.

In 1940 and 1941 the identification of aircraft for close air support tasks held the attention of both air and ground leaders. However, by 1942, they knew that the performance of their forces really would be tested in cooperative--joint-- operations of close air support. Limited time prevented careful study of operational problems and weaknesses. A war-experienced Royal Air Force group captain visiting the War Department predicted some possible problems with the American air support system, especially with planning. He foresaw that Americans would have to undertake more intensive planning and develop a permanent staff to coordinate all the services and arms cooperating in air support. He suggested that planners needed to recognize how quickly air forces were wasted away in battle conditions. Maj. Gen. George C. Kenney, commanding the Fourth Air Force in San Francisco, in April 1942, also offered some predictive observations. He warned that air support would take lots of planes, for observation, attack, and top cover. Any stinginess and the system would fail.⁴⁸

Some offices of the War Department made note of Kenney's admonitions, but the preparation for an attack against the Nazis in Europe, as well as other theater activities, engrossed much of the staff effort and consumed the attention of field commanders desperately preparing their minimally trained troops for overseas passage. By late 1942 the War Department had assigned the expanding air forces many functions. Close air support of ground forces was but one troublesome aspect of airpower. Still, the ground leaders saw a great need for aircraft in the battle against Axis powers, and they got assurance from the War Department that they would have the air support commands dedicated to support the ground battle. They also won the promise of potential support from fighter and bomber commands. War Department leaders generally agreed on doctrine for joint arms warfare, written in light of European war experiences, although there were questions about command of forces at lower levels and about the indoctrination of field commanders. Arnold admitted freely that the air forces were only partially trained. He foresaw problems with close air support, as well as other facets of military activity, in forthcoming operations in North Africa.⁴⁹