A Pattern for Joint Operations: World War II Close Air Support, North Africa
Close Air Support After Kasserine
As the weather improved in March 1943, air commanders expanded their activities. Additional support aircraft, airfields, and supplies diluted some complaints from the ground forces. Air planning became more an integral part of the theater campaign planning. The airmen moved in as an integral part of Alexander's 18th Army Group.47 As Kuter described the scene: "Alexander controlled the land forces in the battle area. Coningham controlled the air forces in the battle area." The two commanders held daily consultations, making "their plans together, each stating what his force could contribute toward the genera1 victory. They worked in complete harmony." In some cases, factors important to the air forces, such as need for close-in airfields and radar sites, were given attention.48
As Montgomery's forces joined the western Tunisian force, combined efforts between air and ground demonstrated aviation's flexibility. For example, when Montgomery was ready to break through the Mareth Defensive Line, a l l three air support forces concentrated for the task. The No. 242 Group left the British First Army, joining up with the XII Air Support Command of the II Corps to conduct a campaign against the German aircraft and airfields that might challenge the British ground advance. The two forces kept enemy air occupied so that the Western Desert Air Force could concentrate all its resources on assisting the advancing army. Fighter-bombers even carried out the commonly eschewed low- level attack operations on German ground troops. Shortly afterwards, the Desert Air Force was reassigned from Montgomery's forces to help the American and British forces in northern Tunisia. Writing to the tactical air forces, Alexander said that "without your support this drive would just not have been possible."49
Following the principles of flexibility, concentration, and primacy of theater interests, at times the close air support resources were transferred to coastal patrol missions. The Allies fully expected that they would shortly push the Axis o u t of Africa. Partly, this was predicated on an expectation of stopping the German resupply from Sicily, Sardinia, and Italy. Using radar and communications intercepts, the air forces tried to choke off support to surviving German forces in North Africa, which maintained a tenacious defense to the end. Airmen hoped that the interdiction might force a surrender. In fact, Germany lost hundreds of aircraft and tons of shipping in three months of heavy action, but supply did not cease entirely. Interdiction was obviously less than completely successful when the Axis chose to put an almost endless effort into a final defensive stance, but interdiction greatly weakened the Axis and forced their early surrender.50
Eisenhower remarked that the new Mediterranean tactical organization "solved one of the most basic problems of modern warfare--how to apply air power most effectively to the support of land operations." He also saw that the corps and division commanders in combat would not be as pleased with the new order: "Direct support of ground troops is naturally the method preferred by the immediate military commander concerned," but his vision did not extend beyond the local battle. It did not consider "the competing demands of individual commanders on a far-flung battlefront, each of whom would naturally like to have at his disposal some segment of the Air Force for his own exclusive use."51
Concerns continued, personality and misunderstanding very much in tow. Stukas continually attacked Allied ground forces, although by April Axis aircraft were either destroyed or pulled out of the Tunisian campaign. The most celebrated case involved Patton and Coningham. On 1 April, while Patton was serving as commander of II Corps, his troops were bombed by enemy aircraft in a morning-long attack. He complained that the lack of air cover allowed the Germans to bomb all his division command posts and many supporting units.52
Coningham, angered by the tone of Patton's report, replied with his own report criticizing the bravery of the II Corps when the enemy attack resulted in only six American casualties. He suggested that the II Corps might not be battle worthy. The sharp personal exchange captured the attention of their senior commanders, including Eisenhower and his chief air deputy, Tedder. Eventually both Coningham and Patton were reprimanded for their bad manners and ordered to meet face to face. The high-level air-ground team remained tense for a time.
Investigation of the incident illustrated the parochial interests in battle. Patton criticized the air support commanders for lack of fighter cover and particularly for their failure to stop an enemy tank advance. Williams, commander of the XII Air Support Command, claimed bad weather prevented the takeoff of aircraft designated for the job. He had even called the Western Desert Air Force for help, but he had cancelled the proposed mission when he heard that Patton's artillery had the tanks under control. Later in the Tunisian campaign, Patton admitted that he was generally getting good close air support. Spaatz reported that the lack of radar coverage and the separation of Patton's headquarters from Williams' contributed to the problem. He took Williams and Patton's chief of staff out to the Eighth Army and Western Desert Air Force to show them how a successful joint operation worked.53
Poor communications continued to be a serious factor throughout the Tunisian campaign. Spaatz urged increased employment of air support parties, assigned to ground forces, to call in requests and guide the ground commanders in air support methods. He hoped that some help could be derived from the light bombers that carried radios. Perhaps they could make air-ground contact and hit targets identified by the air support parties. Unfortunately, the more effective close air support fighter-bombers could not carry the heavy radios necessary for good air-ground communications. The latter still consisted primarily of ground smoke o r colored panels if definite landmarks were not available.54
Spaatz and Coningham gave individual attention to the sensitive air support situation. They tried to instill a practice consistent with concepts evoked at higher levels. Spaatz explained, in a letter to Arnold, how much personal effort by the air commanders was required to keep the peace between the strong-willed air and ground commanders. On one occasion Spaatz noticed that the centralized communications system operated from Alexander's 18th Army Group headquarters did not work adequately. Coordination was required both ways, up the command as well as down. Ground and air commanders needed to actively share problems and activities. In mid-April, after replacing Patton as commander of II Corps, Bradley expressed concern about the lack of aerial photographs and reconnaissance. Spaatz agreed that ground forces had not been given much observation support; most reconnaissance missions had sought intelligence for air force needs. Spaatz thought that he had found the problem in an ineffective air liaison officer assigned to II Corps. He asked Kuter to assign a more senior officer for the rest of the Tunisian campaign.55
By May Allied air forces, including the determined close air support units, helped the Allied ground forces corner 270,000 Axis troops in northeast Tunisia. Allied air finally dominated the Axis air forces, compelling all but a few scattered fighter units to operate from Sicily and Italy. In some ways the Allied offensive, including the air-ground cooperation, was remarkable, especially given one of the original concerns when undertaking TORCH--that American troops were not ready for major operations. Estimates of required air support in October 1942 had depressed everyone in the Washington and London planning circuits. The War Department had half expected North Africa to be a relatively safe place for advanced training, but the maneuvering of a combined Allied force proved to be difficult for inexperienced ground and air personnel.
Some field generals were dubious about the adequacy of their air support. Neither the XII Air Support Command nor the combined Allied air forces could guarantee them protection from disruptive enemy air attack. Enemy aircraft over the battlefield diminished in number but continued their attacks, nonetheless, until the end of operations in May 1943. Division commanders often would g e t air support under the centralized command arrangement. Corps and army commanders could not depend on timeliness of requested air support. Friendly air support often proved ineffective in dislodging the defense-minded Axis ground forces, and air observation of enemy movements was not effective until the air forces could allocate enough escort fighters for the reconnaissance flights.
Air leaders were pleased with changes in air support organization and operational tactics. Greater understanding of aircraft limitations and capabilities by ground leaders, centralization of air support resources, and prioritization of missions allowed the air commander to exercise the accepted principles of air warfare better. The XII Air Support Command commander, Williams, reported that his forces were integrated into the larger theater air concerns, as well as those of the ground commanders he served. In his report on operations Williams noted that he and his principal staff officers "lived and operated with the Corps Commanders during most of the period." While a strong consensus pervaded the joint command posts, sometimes staff officers had to argue out issues. Williams stated that his air staff gave consideration to ground commanders who had urgent requests for close air support. The air support parties provided the communications system and had the experts t o give ground commanders advice on the spot. Basically the airmen ran the air support operation, 80 percent of the support missions originating from their operations center. Both Fredendall and Patton had advised Williams not to wait for close air support requests: "You know what the situation is, just keep pounding them."56
Introduction of the fighter-bomber, fighters with bomb racks and extra armor, promised more effective attacks on the small well-protected targets favored by the ground forces. The new aircraft type, developed from combat experience, was also important as a symbol for the joint air-ground operations team. The close air support portion of the theater tactical air forces now had an aircraft specifically identified for ground attack. The air support command no longer relied only on fighter and light and medium bomber units that were also responsible for other Army Air Forces missions. Furthermore, now close air support was a more clearly defined mission of the theater tactical air forces, even if it held a lower priority than air superiority and battlefield isolation missions.
The military and civilian leaders in Washington and London and the commanders in the Mediterranean Theater were generally pleased with close air support doctrine and practice, even though the debate over allocation of resources and precise points of force control continued among staff officers. Eisenhower appreciated the new centralized, more personal style of air support, although he worried that he was not effectively transmitting his thinking to the field commanders. New doctrinal points did not flow systematically through successive commanders. American inexperience, individualized field generalship, differing opinions about command, and enduring prejudices prevented a smooth transfer of close air support lessons. Much might be blamed on poor coordination of doctrine between theater and field staffs. The different viewpoints of theater and field and those of brigade, division, and corps levels were not bridged successfully. Inadequate command and control systems caused problems. The newly declared independence of the air forces, at a time when tactics and organization for air warfare were changing rapidly, put additional strain on the air-ground relationship. Air and ground leaders had to continue the struggle of forming a cooperative corn bat team .57
