A Pattern for Joint Operations: World War II Close Air Support, North Africa

Requirements for Hemisphere Defense

The German attack on Poland in September 1939 vitalized military thinking about air warfare and particularly sharpened interest in support aviation. The War Department sent officers of all grades and branches to Europe to observe events and send back reports. Concurrent with events in Poland, Harry H. Woodring, the secretary of war, named Arnold to form a board of officers, representing the various Army branches, and to report on the projected employment of an air force. On 1 September the body produced the Air Board Report. Shortly thereafter, Marshall asked for a new statement of air doctrine based on this report. When it was published the following spring, the Air Corps Field Manual (FM) 1-5, Employment of Aviation of the Army, was essentially, like the Air Board Report, a compromise document. It referred to major Air Corps principles, such as the need for air superiority and centralized command. The traditional principle of air warfare as an offensive weapon was not emphasized because war planning was still geared to the likelihood of a Western Hemisphere defense. The function of reconnaissance and liaison air units continued to be that of supporting the ground forces, and the air units retained their permanent assignment under ground force commands. The manual also identified the major air missions for combat or weapons-carrying aircraft under the CHQ Air Force. Along with long-range offensive strikes, air defense against enemy air forces, and miscellaneous patrol and escort functions, the manual listed air support tasks of deep interdiction and "air operations in immediate support of ground forces."¹⁵ 

The ground branches'  views were also included in FM 1-5. The air forces were clearly divided by specialized function, including specially identified support units, to prevent the CHQ Air Force from overlooking ground support missions as seemed possible with long-range bombardment strike tasks being assigned high priority. The ground officers did not want air units being detached from the CHQ Air Force at the last minute. Rather, they wanted a support aviation force identified as a theater of operations weapon, generally tasked by the higher theater commander. Because in the Western Hemisphere defense war planning ground action was less probable, the ground forces accepted forming a small cadre air support force. This support force would be formed into (la nucleus of aviation especially trained in direct support of ground troops and designated for rapid expansion to meet war requirements. In peacetime this aviation will serve as a small, immediately available force for use in minor emergencies and as a laboratory for the continuous development of methods for its employment."¹⁶

The Air Corps also gained exposure for its views in this 1940 field manual. FM 1-5 included surprisingly modern air support concepts, some of which would be shelved when the forces organized for the first test of battle in North Africa. For example, a "two-hatted" concept was employed to explain the air leader's simultaneous command of air units and service to the ground commander. "As a commander, he commands all Air Corps troops. . . . As a staff officer, he is the immediate assistant to the (ground) commander and adviser of his staff on all aviation matters." The manual recognized the weakness of aviation in attacking battlefront enemy troops. "Support aviation is not employed against objectives which can be effectively engaged by available ground weapons . . . , [and] aviation is poorly suited for direct attacks against small detachments o r troops which are well entrenched or disposed." The manual suggested that the maximum effectiveness of support aviation "is secured through centralized control." Further, "combined operations of air and ground forces must be closely coordinated by the commander of the combined force and all operations conducted in accordance with a well-defined plan." Then, recognizing the constraint of limited air resources, the manual stated that operations in immediate support of ground forces are conducted during the critical phases of combat and prior to and at the conclusion of battle."¹⁷