A Pattern for Joint Operations: World War II Close Air Support, North Africa

Doctrine for War

In spite of limitations, planners and commanders used the 1941 maneuvers as the basis, along with observers' reports from Europe, for a final doctrinal statement on air support prior to committing large numbers of American ground forces to combat. As with FM 1-5 in the previous year, the new War Department manual, FM 31-35, Aviation in Support of Ground Forces, published 9 April 1942, was a joint effort, produced by ground and air representatives. By contrast, however, they were more concerned with the organization than with the techniques of air support. They offered no plans for battlefield operations and no priority for targets or missions. Finally, they equivocated about close air support: "Air support targets on the immediate front or flanks of supported units are generally transitory targets of opportunity." In this instance they recommended the dive bomber as the proper aircraft type for close air support, although the air leaders had clearly stated that the dive bomber would be ineffective in close air support where the enemy had good defenses. The manual suggested that deep interdiction targets were the airman's choice.³⁸

Neither were the manual writers clear about the sensitive aspects of the command relationship in joint operations (Chart 1). In one aspect they were relatively straightforward: He--that is, the air support commander--was "habitually attached to or supports an army in the theater." Wearing the command hat, he had direct control of all aircraft units, carrying out the general tasking orders from an army or task force commander. Wearing the staff hat, he served as the army staff air support specialist, giving advice and suggestions to the ground arm officers about employment of aircraft in the ground operations. At both levels, command and staff, the air commander was allowed to practice his specialty, and mutual understanding and cooperation was encouraged. According to the manual, "the basis of effective air support of ground forces is teamwork. The air and ground units in such operations in fact form a combat team. Each member of the team must have the technical skill and training to enable it to perform its part in the operation and a willingness to cooperate thoroughly."³⁹

The problem of cooperative relationship among lower-echelon commanders had proved to be the irresolvable issue, and here the manual writers were ultimately and purposefully evasive. The Army Ground Forces field command organization of army, corps, division, and combat teams was distinguishable from the Army Air Forces command organization of numbered air force, air support command, and bomber, fighter, and reconnaissance groups and squadrons. Thus air and ground organizations each had its own chain of command. Although ground and air units exchanged liaison officers, by doctrine the lowest level of command decisions were made (whether to fly a mission or not) at the army level. Below that, subordinate ground commanders only requested, and not ordered, air support. Except in rare cases when air units were temporarily attached to a ground unit, a request for air support from a company on the line had to travel through battalion, regimental, division, and corps command sections before it reached the army commander or his delegated substitute, the air support commander, who could authorize sending the fighter or bomber squadrons into action.⁴⁰ 

This centralization of air command came out of a principle held by air force officers--one that found air resources too valuable to lose in everyday operations. They talked in terms of flexibility and mass employment. An air unit was an expensive and vulnerable air resource requiring rationing by attachment to the highest field command level. The rationale here was based on the reality that close air support planes were expensive, nonexpendable machines and that pilots were trained at great expense and time. A ground commander would not be able to have his own air resources. By October 1941 McNair had accepted the technological and training limitations of aviation, and he agreed that air resources needed to be under central management. In addition, he argued for the centralization concept, because central control was needed to attain air superiority and because he feared lower-echelon commanders would waste resources. Thus he fought against decentralization, favored by the field commanders, even though it promised speedier response time. Indeed, ground commanders perceived the long command and control communications chain in a centralized system as a guarantee of slow air assistance. 

Generally, the doctrine acknowledged that the air support commander was an expert in aviation practices and that his airplanes, a scarce resource, would be employed under his direction against the most important target of the ground unit in combat, as decided by the highest ground level commander. In reaction, subordinate field commanders tenaciously expressed dissatisfaction with the idea that an airman at the army staff level had some control over the forces at the corps or division level of battle. Their rationale was the need to ensure "unity of command," wherein all resources, including aircraft, should be under the control of a ground commander. The writers waffled here because they did not really know at what level--division, corps, or army--the ground commander would be during battle. The compromise doctrine, FM 31-35, offered neither true centralization nor unity of command. The air and ground officers who wrote FM 31-35 understood that it was theoretically based, that combat experience was needed to validate doctrine, and that leaders would interpret it in light of specific campaigns.⁴¹ 

Additional doctrine published before battle verification in North Africa reflected the expanding importance and increased responsibilities for the air forces. By 1942 there was the greater question of whether any new ideas could be instilled in the minds of field commanders in the midst of preparation for combat. A good example was FM 100-15, Larger Units, issued 29 June 1942. In this document not only was a strategic mission formally established but also a priority was set for one aspect of air support aviation that would restrict efforts at close air support. The manual stated that in campaigns "the initial objective [of air operations I must include the attainment of air superiority." Corps o r division commanders accepted the idea of air superiority as a high-priority mission for the air forces, but they expected aircraft for close air support as well. Members of a n air support board met in December 1942 to suggest revisions, but the Army Air Forces and Army Ground Forces members argued to delay publication of an updated air support manual until differing concepts were more fully tested in combat .⁴²

An additional issue was whether doctrine written by the headquarters staff in 1942 could be disseminated to the field in time to educate and convince regimental, brigade, division, and corps ground commanders, as well as the air commanders of the squadrons, groups, and air commands. The record suggests that indoctrination in air and ground force doctrine tended to be limited to an officer's own arm. Even though it was crucial to close air support operations, neither air nor ground officers gained effective knowledge of each other's branch doctrine until mid-1943, when training programs became more realistic.⁴³