A Pattern for Joint Operations: World War II Close Air Support, North Africa

Increasing Influence of the Air Arm, 1938-1942

In November 1938, concerned about Hitler's bullying of major European nations at Munich to gain the Sudetenland for Germany, and the expansion and quality of European air forces, President Franklin D. Roosevelt opened wide the door to an Army aviation revolution. Whatever the views of the War Department, the president wanted to comply with English and French requests for American aircraft, and he thought by expanding the Air Corps the aircraft industry would produce more for everyone. On the fourteenth he called a group of his military leaders to the White House. Generals Malin Craig, Army chief of staff, George C. Marshall, deputy chief of staff, and Henry H. Arnold, chief of the Air Corps, were among those summoned. The president said he wanted an appropriate force for protection of the Western Hemisphere against the menacing intentions of Germany and Italy. He wanted the Army Air Corps, modernized with the latest combat aircraft, to be that force.⁹

If there was ever an event that changed World War II close air support, this was it. Congress debated the aviation issue for a few months, and then in early 1939 it gave the Air Corps the first in a series of very large budget increases. The presidential and congressional attention helped inflate Air Corps prestige, giving it special rank among the Army combat arms. The new status pointed to prospective independence from a subordinate position in a field army, and fostered a view that air-ground operations would have to be thought of in terms of joint command relations. At the very least, the new influence gave the Air Corps greater leverage to argue its view of ground support aviation as well as other military aviation functions. ¹⁰

The case for the air arm did not develop without counterarguments. For one, the War Department convinced Congress to increase spending for all military forces. In 1939 Congress appropriated large sums for Army expansion and modernization, as well as for aviation. Secondly, with the onset of World War II in September the ground force leaders, impressed by the extensive use of aircraft in the warfare, increasingly desired more aircraft as they updated ground warfare plans. When the part played by the dive bombers in the stunning German Army victories was publicized, the ground arms raised their demand for air support and specialized aircraft for close air support. Diverging viewpoints, strongly expressed, called for concession and accommodation.¹¹

General Marshall's leadership did not antagonize the air officers, as did some of his chief of staff predecessors. From the airmen's point of view, Marshall was a true leader of a modern air-ground team. He stood out as a promoter of compromise and cooperation in this time of rapid change in ground and air relationships. He helped institutionalize some differences within the General Staff so that debates were not always publicized as interbranch struggles. Some issues had interbranch proponents and opponents: ground as well as air officers who wanted greater attention given to close air support versus their counterparts who accepted emphasis on interdiction; or advocates for centralized control versus those who wanted air assets controlled at a lower command level.

Marshall understood more about aviation than most ground generals. Over the years he had been a student of air power. In 1938, when he first arrived in Washington, he accompanied Maj. Gen. Frank M. Andrews, then commander of the GHQ Air Force (the operational command of the Air Corps) on a tour of continental air facilities. As deputy chief of staff, in 1939, he and Chief of the Air Corps Arnold, together, "worked out the details of an entire air plan for the War Department."¹²  When he assumed chief of staff duties in September 1939, Marshall gave positions on the Army General Staff to large numbers of air officers. As well respected as he was, the appointment of Andrews as assistant chief of staff for operations (G-3), then later as commander of the Panama Defense Command, turned heads among old Army leaders. Andrews became the first air officer to hold the positions normally given to ground officers. Marshall made it a point to appoint staff officers and field commanders who knew about the changes in air warfare.¹³

Working hard to reconcile the differences between air and ground officers, Marshall took the position that the air forces needed to operate with a large degree of autonomy. He validated the functional distinctiveness of and gave great independence to the air forces when he approved an Air Staff for Arnold. In 1940 and 1941 he and Arnold saw eye-to-eye on the long-argued issue of independence for air forces. While many air advocates, in and out of the military, urged independence along the Royal Air Force model, Marshall and Arnold agreed that existing war conditions prevented such a radical reorganization. Still, with the rapid growth of the Army, these leaders understood the need to rely on subordinates, and they gave the staff officers lots of rein and field commanders increased autonomy-supplementary prerogatives of command--especially in operational matters. Arnold kept his word, not advocating an independent organization for the air forces while war continued. It was only natural for him, however, to work consistently for greater influence of the air arm. Technically, Arnold had no command authority over field operations, but found enough flexibility in the wartime Army General Staff and field commands to affect air operations around the world. The rising stock of aviation gave him, and other air leaders, more say in the development of air-ground doctrine.¹⁴