A Pattern for Joint Operations: World War II Close Air Support, North Africa

Planning Close Air Support for North Africa

 Allied planners now placed much responsibility for the air-ground system on the ground commander: "Effective air support of ground troops is dependent on a proper estimate of the situation by the supported commander." But they still waffled on the level of command authority over air support. Although all air forces would "operate under the command of the Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces," the Allied commander could allot forces to a task force commander. The task force commander would normally retain control, but he could also "designate p a r t of his combat aviation to assist directly a specified unit of the Task Force." A clear potential existed for air support units being controlled by brigade or division commanders as well as corps or army commanders. The remarkable aspect of this Allied directive was that it ran against the trend of equality between air and ground forces being established by a successful Allied force operating in the Western Desert.⁵ 

The planners also included in their memorandum some long-running concerns of airmen: "As a general rule, only those targets which cannot be reached quickly and effectively by artillery should be assigned to combat aviation." Command was generally centralized, either under the commander-in-chief, Allied Forces, or under a task force commander. Probable targets would be discovered and reported by observation aircraft that, lacking radios, would report on their return to base. Most air support operations would then be planned ahead of time and often by the highest command authority rather than the battalion, regiment, or division in the field. The final line of the directive, before Brig. Gen. Walter Bedell Smith's signature block, warned about the vulnerability and scarcity of air forces: "Available direct support aviation must neither be dispersed nor frittered away on unimportant targets. The mass of such support should be reserved for concentration and overwhelming attack upon important objectives."⁶ 

Because most of the force for TORCH would be American, it was appropriate that British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Roosevelt picked Eisenhower for the post of commander-in-chief, directing a small AFHQ staff. Eisenhower's task force was organized largely by national components. The desired integration of this force had to be carried out by Eisenhower's personal effort rather than through a combined organization. Ground forces were originally organized into American and British task forces, supported by the Allied Naval Expeditionary Force and the American Twelfth Air Force and British Eastern Air Command . ⁷ 

To gather enough resources for the Twelfth Air Force, Arnold stripped the England-based Eighth Air Force of fighter, light bomber, and even some heavy bomber squadrons. These and additional units fresh from training in the United States, and with most personnel only partially trained, were formed into three functional Twelfth Air Force components: XII Bomber Command, XII Fighter Command, and XII Air Support Command. On 23 October Maj. Gen. James H. Doolittle, just back from the raid on Japan, assumed command of these units as chief of the new Twelfth Air Force and as chief airman on Eisenhower's staff.⁸ 

While all three components of the Twelfth Air Force would support Eisenhower's theater mission, the XII Air Support Command had a first priority to support the Fifth Army. I t would provide close air support functions of close-in bombing and strafing of enemy ground forces, air defense against enemy aircraft, and observation. I t would also undertake missions not connected to the immediate needs of the ground forces, such as attacking enemy air facilities, long-range reconnaissance, and bombing and strafing deep in the enemy rear. Eisenhower agreed that the Twelfth Air Force should employ "both tactical and strategic elements" in common with the British air forces practices. By "strategic elements" he meant bombing units that could destroy distant military targets, such as air bases, shipping, ports, and communications centers.* The XII Fighter and XII Bomber Commands, indeed all Allied air resources, would be available to support TORCH ground forces as determined by the commander-in-chief. Eisenhower came to his command with a long-time interest in aviation support for the ground forces. While he wanted support for the ground forces, he also supported the strategic bombing campaign, directed by Maj. Gen. Carl Spaatz in England, because it would soften up Germany and thus facilitate success in future battles. Given his responsibilities for theater and large strategic concerns, Eisenhower was inclined to see the unity-of-command concept from the theater point of view. Consistent with Army doctrine, the theater commander controlled all resources. In turn, Eisenhower had a tendency to think of aviation, if not close air support specifically, in terms of theater rather than of army, corps, or division interests. He was more inclined, therefore, to allow the Army Air Forces to centralize air resources and have command at a higher level.⁹

Anticipating the needs of future war, Arnold and other staff airmen in Washington had developed similar concepts for command on a modern battlefield. They had accepted the necessity for command decisions being made at a theater or task force level of command, but they gave this unity-of-command concept another twist when talking about joint air-ground operations. Arnold advocated the "principle of command," where the air commander would have "direct command of the tactical operations" of the air forces in air operations. During July 1942 he articulated the concept of "direct command" in a memo to Maj. Gen. Thomas T. Handy, the assistant chief of staff for operations. Arnold argued that the air commander was the specialist and that he should have control over his particular operations. He cited Maj. Gen. M. F. Harmon: "The Air Force Commanders are especially trained to appreciate the peculiar powers and limitations of the Air Arm, and are therefore particularly suited to exercise tactical command in order to realize the maximum performance of the units involved." It is not clear how much of Arnold's concept meshed with the idea of a task force concept of Eisenhower, but Eisenhower came to accept great independence among his commanders. He saw his air, ground, and naval chiefs having a dual role. First, everyone worked with Eisenhower's staff in the development of plans; then each became the responsible commander for executing his part of the whole opera tion. ¹⁰

As the vagaries of war would have it, the Combined Chiefs of Staff did not establish a clear directive for Eisenhower until the last few weeks before the invasion was to take place. Eisenhower would make a three-pronged invasion of North Africa. That meant the American ground forces and supporting air forces would have to be split into three elements: one for an invasion at Oran, Algeria; another to land in French Morocco; and another, a combined British-American force under British Lt. Cen. K. A. N. Anderson, to invade at Algiers (Map 2). The role of the air forces in support of the ground forces was confused when the functional organization of an air force (into bombardment, fighter, and air support commands) was altered, with the air commands split up in their assignment to different ground invasion commands. Time was incredibly brief for gathering sufficient air support forces and for organizing them in an effective manner. 

TORCH planners gave the task force commanders clear operational control of their supporting air resources. Maj. Gen. George S. Patton, Jr., sailing directly from the United States, would command the Western Task Force landing in French Morocco. His command included Brig. Gen. John K. Cannon's XII Air Support Command, which also had been recently formed in the United States. Maj. Gen. Lloyd Fredendall would command the Central Task Force landing in Oran. He controlled portions of the XII Fighter and XII Bomber Commands led by Col. Lauris Norstad, Doolittle's operations officer. The multiple air services for ground support, as exemplified in an air support command, were missing in the l a t t e r case, an indication of indifference or fuzzy thinking about the kind of aircraft to be used in close air support work in North Africa.¹¹ 

Even with the last-minute changes, TORCH planners insisted on following the dictates of British-United States air doctrine. For example, after the Oran and Casablanca ground forces won their battles and reconsolidated into the Fifth Army, the XII Air Support Command would continue to provide the single point of air support service. In addition, the bomber and fighter commands would be on call for close air support and other ground tasks; but, when not on alert, they would turn to the "normal" (planned interdiction) Air Force objectives. In a report to Patton, Doolittle agreed that ground warfare was the main focus of the theater operations. He also wanted it clarified that first priority went to air superiority and that supporting ground action came second.¹²

As envisioned by Eisenhower's planners, the Twelfth Air Force would provide communications equipment and personnel necessary to the command and control* of air units. Twelfth Air Force air support parties attached to infantry divisions and armored columns would relay air support requests to an air support control center, set up next to the task force command post. After the task force commander approved requests for air support from the subordinate units, they would be transmitted to the Twelfth Air Force. Air Force expertise would play its part a t the Twelfth Air Force or the XII Air Support Command. The XII Air Support Command would then allocate missions to the appropriate subordinate fighter, bomber, or observation unit.¹³ 

The one British and two American forces were both casually and awkwardly integrated. Problems resulted. The command chain, from task force commanders upwards to Eisenhower and his small AFHQ staff , was clear enough. So too was the command downward, from task force commander to supporting air forces. Connections in other directions, often necessary and useful in a combined operation, were weak. For example, in terms of aviation, Air Marshal Sir William Welsh of the Eastern Air Command, supporting the British First Army, had but very oblique coordination responsibilities for the Royal Air Force Middle East, Malta forces, and British naval aviation. As another example, the two air commanders, Welsh with the Eastern Air Command, and Doolittle with the Western Air Command that supported the American task forces, were not connected. They made their plans in isolation from one another. Planning for aviation was flawed by the separate tasking and areas of responsibilities for the ground and air support forces for the invasion. An important question asked by the planners was whether the flaws would jeopardize the invasion itself or whether they would be unimportant until forces had time to reorganize once solidly ashore.¹⁴