A Pattern for Joint Operations: World War II Close Air Support, North Africa

Prologue

During World War II (1939-45), as today, close air support had a special notoriety among the many tactical aviation missions. An investigation of events and issues significant to close air support should illustrate its importance in modern warfare, as well as i t s complex nature that caused great command problems during battlefield operations. Close air support was affected by rapidly changing world events as the nation's military focus shifted from a peacetime to prewar status--a position of cautious defensiveness that involved preparing for a hemisphere defense--and then, in December 1941, from a prewar to wartime status--a position of total offensiveness in Europe and the Far East, Other factors affecting the importance and effectiveness of close air support included the accelerating incidence of mobility, mechanization, and firepower in military operations concepts; the performance of improved aircraft; and the decisions to make greater use of air resources in battle. Close air support issues that captured the greatest attention of the War Department staff and field commanders were usually concerned with identifying aircraft and personnel resources, and their subsequent allocation and control. The l a t t e r was especially important in terms of target and mission selection. Most air force leaders f e l t that air resources could contribute more if used to a t t a c k enemy aircraft and ground targets away from the heavily defended battlefield. Most field commanders wanted control of air firepower so that they could mass forces for the ground battle; they wanted close support aviation resources, particularly observation and defensive fighter aircraft, to be considered organic to the battlefield and to be commanded by field commanders. While close air support produced and symbolized a struggle between the air and ground arms of the Army, the senior leaders sought to counterbalance the divisiveness by fostering the idea that subordinate commanders must encourage consensus, cohesion, and cooperation. There were challenges enough just learning to cooperate with the Allies on the ultimate defeat of a determined enemy. Branches of the Army should work toward an effective command front. The problems and compromises that followed indicate that this story of close air support during World War II has a very modern flavor and relevance.

In the late 1930s close air support was meshed into a general category known in the prewar doctrinal manuals as "aviation in support of ground forces."* Tactical aviation, then, included all the specialties that, even today, support the ground forces. Tasks included troop transport, air supply, long-distance reconnaissance, defending against enemy aircraft (especially by maintaining air superiority), and disruption of enemy supply and communications, as well as the tactical tasks associated with close air support. The latter included battlefield observation and liaison, defense of the battlefield and friendly territory from enemy aircraft, and bombing and strafing of enemy forces and weapons in the immediate vicinity of battlefield operations. With a change in the military mission to fit Western Hemisphere defense priorities by 1939, and with the development of faster and bigger aircraft, the War Department modified the concepts for employment of tactical aviation. Close air support, in particular, was devalued in doctrinal statements.

After September 1939, as war ensued in Western Europe, the ground arms of the Army saw a greater need for all kinds of air support and, in thus subsequently stressed their desire for close air support. This happened at a time when the air arm thinking and aviation technology suggested that aircraft operations over the modern battlefield would not be effective or practical. Aircraft were too vulnerable to enemy antiaircraft fire and could not be easily replaced. Close air support became even more marked as a particularly distinctive, troublesome, and complex issue. Even with advancing technology, designing support aircraft proved difficult. Disagreement and debate about doctrine increased; consequently, development of operational procedures stalled in long debates that could not be satisfied in the many field exercises held to test the debated doctrinal ideas. All the while air leaders gained a greater say about aviation matters, both those dealing with support of ground operations and those connected to strategic air warfare operations. Whatever the Army Air Forces mission, its rising influence and growing independence challenged the cohesion of command and pointed to the need for a new consensus among coequal air and ground component commanders.