Uniqueness of Pacific War

The Pacific war was unique in many respects, as was the European war, and great reservation should be used in assuming that what was effective or not effective under those circumstances would be similarly effective at other times and under different circumstances. Japan's initial war strategy called for a war of limited objectives. Her capabilities did not permit an attack on our basic supporting strength. She was, however, a fanatically determined enemy, well prepared initially, and the fighting quality of her soldiers, seamen and airmen should not be underestimated.

Japan's geographical situation determined that the Pacific war should in large measure be a war for control of the sea, and to insure control of the sea, for control of the air over it. As a result, attacks against warships and merchant ships and amphibious operations for possession of island positions on which forward bases could be located were close to the heart of the struggle. Carrier task forces, surface ships to provide logistic support, and submarines therefore assumed roles of unusual importance.

Japan's industrial potential was approximately 10 percent of that of the United States. Even though her research and technical design work was not purely imitative, her ability to develop reliable operating equipment in the new fields was low. Her radar and communications equipment was weak. She could not build sufficient ships or escort vessels. She lacked construction equipment to build adequate airfields. She was always hampered by a lack of oil. Her antiaircraft was outmoded. She could not economically afford to build adequate shelters for her population. She could not both disperse her industry and also repair damaged plants. She chose dispersal rather than repair, but she had insufficient means even to disperse effectively.