Recommendations

Over and above the numerous recommendations scattered throughout preceding sections of this report, of which the recommendation that we develop protection for our civilian population and for our economy is one of the most important, the Survey has been impressed with the need for concrete and prompt action to encourage adequate research and development; to assure adequate intelligence during peacetime; to integrate our military establishments; and to increase the national appreciation of the necessity for continued strength of the United States as a force for peace.

Research and development.--The "blitzkrieg" technique is of enormous danger. This conclusion, derived initially from the European war, is strongly supported by the Japanese experience. A mobilized and well-trained striking force enjoying a certain technical superiority can overwhelm in short order the forces of a country of far greater basic long-term strength. In the opening phases of the Pacific war the Japanese were able to overrun 130,000,000 people and an area of enormous strategic importance in the space of a few months. This was true in spite of the fact that from the time of the Munich conference in 1938 we had been on notice that aggression against the peace of the world was possible and that the intervening years and the experience of our Allies had been invaluable in permitting us to take the necessary steps to revise our strategic concepts, to apply our advanced scientific and development resources to the improvement of our weapons, and to begin our industrial and military mobilization. The distances of the Pacific fortunately gave us space, and therefore time, in which to absorb the initial blow while our increasing strength and Japan's increasing logistic problems reversed the initial disadvantages facing our advanced forces.

Science has increased tremendously the destructive capability of modern weapons and promises further developments in the future. Given an adequate supply of atomic bombs, the B-29s based in the Marianas had sufficient strength to have effectively destroyed in a single day every Japanese city with a population in excess of 30,000 people. In the future, national security will depend to a large degree on technical superiority of weapons and on operating and maintenance proficiency of personnel. Peacetime military strategic planning must be pointed to and supported by a vigorous program of scientific research and development.

If the United States is not to be forced to hasty and inadequate mobilization every time the threat of aggression arises in the world, it is essential that in the field of military weapons and tactics she be technically not merely abreast of, but actually ahead of any potential aggressor. It is not generally realized the degree to which basic scientific research was neglected in the United States during the course of the war in order to concentrate on the belated development of the specific weapons immediately required, nor the degree to which we lagged behind Germany in advanced aerodynamics, jet propulsion and the development of guided missiles. In air armament and torpedoes, even the Japanese were ahead of us. One or two years' lag in either basic research or in the development of reliable military application of such research can only be made up with difficulty, if at all. This type of work has become so complex that expenditures for research and development in the order of one billion dollars annually may be required to assure an acceptable degree of national security.

Intelligence. -- At the start of the Pacific war our strategic intelligence was highly inadequate, and our overall war plans, insofar as they were based on faulty information and faulty interpretation of accurate information, were unrealistic. After Pearl Harbor the obtaining and analysis of economic and industrial information necessary to the planning of an attack on Japan's sustaining resources required several years of the most strenuous effort and even then substantial gaps remained. If a comparable lack of intelligence should exist at the start of a future national emergency, it might prove disastrous.

In the field of operational intelligence considerable forward strides were made during the Pacific war. The requirements in this field for a large volume of minutely detailed and accurate work, for complex analysis geared to rapidly changing capabilities of forces and weapons, and for speed, all place a heavy burden on training, competence and organization. These requirements were not fully met in the Pacific war; the deficiency was at times serious. This was in large measure traceable to a prewar lack of trained and competent operational intelligence officers to provide an adequate nucleus for an expanding organization.

The basis for adequate intelligence can only be laid in peacetime. The solution to our problems in this held appears in part to be the greater centralization to be provided by the National Intelligence Authority, particularly in securing more adequate coordination and dissemination. It appears also to lie in close integration into the various operating organizations of appropriate intelligence units, adequate budgets and personnel for intelligence work, and a sufficient increase in the prestige attached to such work to attract the highest quality of personnel. This latter can only come from increased training in intelligence and active appreciation of its functions on the part of other Army, Navy, and Government officials. The present lack of recognized responsibility for intelligence work by the various operating organizations and the present shortage of trained and competent intelligence personnel give cause for alarm and require correction.

Integration of our military establishments.-- Organizational deficiencies in the Japanese Government contributed to Japan's entering a disastrous war and subsequently contributed to the absoluteness of her defeat. The form of her governmental organization provided no means for civilian control of the military or for obtaining effective coordination between the Army and Navy. Military policy was inconsistent with the foreign policy of the cabinet, the Japanese Army and Navy tending to make their own foreign policy in accordance with their individual aims, capabilities and requirements. During the war, bureaucratic rivalry between her Army and Navy impeded coordinated strategic and tactical planning, the proper employment of her air power, the development of adequate logistics and the efficient utilization of her economic resources. The existence of such joint or combined organizations as the Supreme War Council, the Supreme War Direction Council, the Board of Field Marshals and Fleet Admirals, the Imperial General Headquarters served mainly to hide the fact that real unity, integration, and coordination were conspicuously lacking.

Even though the United States did not achieve unity of command in the Pacific as a whole, each theater commander used the air, ground and sea forces assigned to him as an integrated or coordinated team. Coordination and compromise among theater commanders was largely achieved in all major respects. Such lack of complete integration as existed was in a large measure traceable back through the structure of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the basic structure of our prewar military organization.

The Congress of the United States is today considering legislation for the reorganization and integration of our military establishments. The Survey is of the opinion that the prompt passage of appropriate legislation is in the national interest.

The lessons of the Pacific war strongly support that form of organization which provides unity of command, capable of clear and effective decision at the top, strengthens civilian control and thus provides closer integration of military policy with foreign and domestic policy, and favors a high degree of coordination in planning, intelligence, and research and development. Such unity of command should, however, decentralize administrative burdens and permit specialized training and the free development of the component forces, even at the risk of some duplication.

Within a department of common defense which provides unity of command and is itself oriented toward air and new weapons, the Survey believes that, in addition to the Army and the Navy, there should be an equal and coordinate position for a third establishment. To this establishment should be given primary responsibility for passive and active defense against long range attack on our cities, industries and other sustaining resources; for strategic attack, whether by airplane or guided missile; and for all air units other than carrier air and such land-based air units as can be more effective as component parts of the Army or Navy. The mission of such a new establishment would differ considerably from that of an autonomous air force and would, in certain respects, require additional and broader experience than has heretofore been required by the Army air forces alone.

Strength as a force for peace. -- The Survey's report on the European war stated that the great lesson to be learned in the battered cities of England and the ruined cities of Germany is that the best way to win a war is to prevent it from occurring. This is fully supported by the example of the devastated cities of Japan and their unhappy and hungry surviving inhabitants. The prevention of war must be the ultimate end to which our best efforts are devoted. It has been suggested, and wisely so, that this objective is well served by insuring the strength and the security of the United States. The United States was founded and has since lived upon principles of tolerance, freedom and good will at home and abroad. Strength based on these principles is no threat to world peace. Prevention of war will not be furthered by neglect of strength or lack of foresight or alertness on our part. Those who contemplate evil and aggression find encouragement in such neglect. Hitler relied heavily upon it. The Japanese would never have attacked Pearl Harbor had they not correctly assessed the weakness of our defenses in the Pacific and had they not incorrectly assessed the fighting determination of the United States when attacked.

Suggestions for assuring the military strength and security of the United States are by no means intended as a recommendation for a race in arms with other nations; nor do they reflect a lack of confidence in the prospect of international relationships founded upon mutual respect and good will which will themselves be a guarantee against future wars. The development of an intelligent and coordinated approach to American security can and should take place within the framework of the security organization of the United Nations.

The United States as a member of the United Nations has covenanted not to use force except in defense of law as embodied in the purposes and principles of the United Nations' Charter. As one of the great powers we must be prepared to act in defense of law and to do our share in assuring that other nations live up to their covenant.

The United States must have the will and the strength to be a force for peace.