Army Air Forces in World War II

In accordance with the above plan, the Japanese Army was given primary responsibility for conquering Malaya, Sumatra and Burma and, because of the limited range of its planes, for furnishing initial air support in northern Luzon only above 16º north latitude. The Japanese Navy was assigned primary responsibility, in addition to the attack on Pearl Harbor, for initially launching operations in the Philippines, Borneo, Celebes, Java, northern New Guinea, the Bismarck Archipelago and out to the Gilbert Islands and Wake. The Army was to assume control in the Philippines as soon as the landing forces were established ashore. On 7 December 1941 the Japanese army and Navy air forces were accordingly disposed as follows:

Army Unit	Aircraft Strength	Deployment
Third Flying Division	550	Malayan Campaign.
Fifth Flying Division	175	Philippines Campaign.
First Flying Brigade	150	China.
Second Flying Division	450	Manchuria (Reserve).
First Flying Division	50	Japan.
Total Army	1,375

Naval Unit	Aircraft Strength	Deployment
Twenty-first and Twenty-third Air Flotillas	300	Philippines Campaign.
Twenty-second Air Flotilla.	150	Malayan Campaign.
Twenty-fourth Air Flotilla	50	Marshalls.
Carrier Force (6 CVs)	400	Pearl Harbor.
Combined Fleet	75	Seaplanes attached to surface vessels.
Miscellaneous	275	Japan.
Total Navy	1,250
Grand Total	2,625

The Japanese were not depending solely upon the volume of their air strength in these initial engagements, although they believed they possessed sufficient superiority in numbers over Allied air forces in the Pacific. More than on numbers, the Japanese relied on surprise and speed of advance, and upon the training and experience of their airmen. In 1941 the average first-line Japanese pilot had about 500 - 800 flying hours, and about 50 percent of Japanese Army pilots and 10 percent of Japanese Navy pilots had had actual combat experience in China or in border fighting with the Soviet Union in 1939. The carrier air groups were especially trained in shallow-water torpedo drops for the Pearl Harbor attack, and the Japanese Army air units were trained for support of ground operations in Malaya and the Philippines.

Facing the Japanese, the United States and its Allies had the following land-based air strength in the Pacific:

Country	Aircraft Strength	Deployment
U. S. Army and Navy Air Forces	182	Philippines
	12	Wake.
	12	Midway.
	387	Hawaii.
Royal Netherlands East Indies Air Forces	200	Netherlands East Indies.
Royal Air Force	332	Malaya.
Royal Australian Air Forces	165	Australia, Solomons, Netherlands East Indies, and Malaya.
Total Allied	1,290

These forces were quickly overwhelmed. Fifty percent of the planes were destroyed on the ground. Our three lightly supported aircraft carriers in the Pacific did not constitute a sufficient force to warrant their being risked in those operations.

Following the initial successes at Pearl Harbor, Malaya and in the Philippines, Wake and Guam were occupied in December, and Rabaul in January. The Japanese gained air superiority in Burma with the loss of 102 planes and, with troops specially trained for jungle fighting, occupied that area at a cost of 7,000 soldiers killed. At the end of 4 months of war, they had carried out the substance of their initial program and with greater ease than they had foreseen. Total merchant shipping losses were 51 ships. Much of the equipment which had originally been scheduled for movement into the southern islands was found to be unnecessary and was left behind in order to achieve greater speed. Certain of the Japanese leaders were concerned by the skillful and unexpectedly determined resistance of our ground forces in the Philippines. They attributed this in part to inefficient Japanese close-air support. But in some circles, the skill and determination with which our isolated forces conducted the defense was correctly assessed as an ominous cloud on the horizon.