Army Air Forces in World War II

Operations

Air operations in this stab at Fortress Europe may be said to have begun as far back as 28 April 1944, when heavy bombers attacked Toulon. Between then and 10 August, when the preliminary air phase started, MAAF flew more than 6,000 sorties and dropped 12,500 tons of bombs on southern France. There was variety of reasons for these attacks--normal anti-U-boat and anti-Luftwaffe warfare, interdiction of supply lines into Italy, and smashing French marshalling yards as direct cooperation with the Normandy thrust--but more than 25 percent of the sorties were specifically designed at the time of their execution to cooperate with the forthcoming operation. The remainder should be considered to have rendered indirect cooperation.

By far the largest share of the bombs--8,353 tons--were dropped on lines of communication, ports coming next with 2,133, then industry with 1,141, and airfields with 872. In addition to the very extensive military damage thus achieved, this long series of sporadic attacks undoubtedly helped to cloak the Allied assault plan by preventing the preliminary planned air phase from being immediately evident when it began on 10 August.

MATAF's Bombing Plan divided the offensive air operations into four phases:

Phase I - Period prior to D minus 5, discussed above
Phase II - Period D minus 5 to 0350 (B) hours D-day
Phase III - Period 0350 (B) hours D-day to H-hour (0800) D-day
Phase IV - Period thereafter

This program was issued on 4 August, by which time, of course, Phase I was nearly over. In the 5 days remaining of that period, three tasks were assigned to the air forces--counter air operations in the Marseille, Toulouse, and Udine areas by Strategic and in the Po Valley by Tactical; interdiction of communications, Strategic taking the rail line Valence-Grenoble-Montmelian-Modane and Tactical the rail bridges across the Rhone south of Valence as well as its regular operational areas in northern Italy; and finally anti-U-boat operations, chiefly in Toulon waters, by Strategic.

Beginning 10 August, D minus 5, a new set of assignments took priority over the three tasks of Phase I, which, however, continued to be air force responsibilities. Phase II called for the neutralization of the main coastal batteries and radar stations in the assault area and the heckling of coastal defense troops by heavy bombing without jeopardizing tactical surprise. In conjunction with the deception plan, attacks on the invasion area were to be screened by similar offensive action against identical targets in four coastal localities between Via Reggio and Beziers. By alternating and scattering the intense bombing effort among these four areas, it was hoped to maintain the fiction of a false attack and conceal the true Allied intent until about H minus 16 hours. The scale of effort needed to neutralize each of the minute targets was carefully studied and the following total effort allocated:

42 group missions, heavy bombers, plus escort fighters detailed for R.C.M targets
20 night bomber sorties - MASAF
28 group missions, medium bombers
512 fighter-bomber sorties
12 night bomber sorties - MATAF

Weather interfered with the original schedule, but by 0350 hours D-day virtually the entire Phase II task had been completed. Effective sorties totaled 5,408, split about equally between Strategic and Tactical, while tonnage dropped totaled 6,740, of which Strategic supplied 4,451. Cost of the effort was 50 aircraft, of which 15 were heavies, 4 mediums, 2 patrol bombers, and 29 fighters or fighter-bombers.

Phase III commenced 1 hour after the conclusion of Phase II, 0350 hours D-day, and lasted the 4 hours and 10 minutes until H-hour, 0800. Its purpose - "to cause the maximum destruction to enemy coastal and beach defenses utilizing all available forces." The plan therefore allocated to the task 12 groups of escorted heavies from Strategic. both of Tactical's medium bomber wings, and the full striking power of XII TAC's fighter-bomber. The planned schedule of attack:

0550-0610 - Small formations, each of four fighter-bombers, to patrol the assault area and silence any guns seen firing.
0610-0730 - Small formation of heavy, medium, and fighter-bombers to carry out repeated attacks to destroy selected gun positions.
0635-0730 - Small formations of fighter-bombers to attack selected gun positions.
0700-0730 - Formations of medium and heavy bombers to carry out drenching attacks on the assault beaches with the object of beating down underwater obstacles and beach defenses.
0800 onward - Eight Navy fighter-bombers, eight Navy R/F fighters and 16 fighter-bombers of XII TAC to be on call to attack any remaining targets.

All aircraft were assigned rigid lanes of approach to the assault area. Bomb loadings for beach attacks were fragmentation and demolition, instantaneously fuzed, and not exceeding 260 pounds. For gun positions large demolition bombs with short delay fuzing were prescribed. Beaches were to be bombed over their whole length and to a depth of 400 yards, the pattern commencing 75 yards to seaward. To avoid damaging friendly naval craft, no beach bombing runs were allowed at an angle greater than 45 degrees to the beach line.

Dawn of D-day found the beach area overcast. In accordance with a previously agreed plan whereby the ground forces did not wish to risk air attack by PFF methods without some visual reference points, instructions were given for this limited PFF attack. Because of this restriction demanded in the interest of safety for our surface forces, some of the heavy sorties were noneffective. Remainder used PFF technique or found an occasional hole in the cloud which permitted visual attack. A large percentage of the medium effort was likewise frustrated. All told, in Phase III, MAAF dispatched 959 sorties, of which 610 were effective. Tonnage totaled 774 and the cost was 2 heavies, 3 mediums, and 1 fighter-bomber. Despite the weather difficulties, the results achieved were highly satisfactory. The three assault divisions which hit the beaches at H-hour met virtually no resistance. Two days later the Supreme Allied Commander signaled the Air C-in-C as follows:

Please convey to the Air Forces under your command my appreciation of the bombing and fighter-bombing attacks for the operation [ codeword omitted] executed by them during the periods prior to D-day and on D-day itself. The Naval and Army Commanders whom I saw yesterday attribute largely their successes and small losses to the effect produced by the action of the Air Forces.

The ground attack which followed this heavy aerial preparation had two phases--sneak landings during the night of D minus 1 by Commandos and paratroops with several precise assignments, and the main assault at H-hour by three United States divisions and a glider-borne task force. The Commando and Special Service forces involved in the sneak landings had two tasks:

To silence batteries on the Hyeres Isles which dominated the St. Tropez beaches
To cut the one coastal highway at each end of the projected beachhead area.

This coastal road was bisected at Frejus, near the middle of the area, by a road leading from the interior down the one valley through the coastal hills. It fell to the airborne forces to bottle up this line of enemy approach by landing astride the road near the hamlet Le Muy, some 18 miles inland.

The air plan which went into effect immediately following H-hour was in reality the normal procedure of air cooperation with ground advance. The air forces undertook three tasks:

To cause maximum destruction of defenses in the assault area
To isolate the battlefield by destroying the remaining rail and road bridges across the Rhone and other rivers
To attack enemy troop movements

Throughout D-day Phase IV specified the participation of Strategic and the two medium wings, but thereafter only XII TAC. In consequence, D-day witnessed the mightiest air effort ever put out in a single day in the Mediterranean - 4,249 effective sorties and 3,881 tons of bombs. Losses totaled 46 and claims were 8-1-0.

The Fifteenth Air Force had given direct assistance to the Normandy landings by bombing marshalling yards in southern France in May and June. Now, with an invasion in the south, another component of USSTAF, the Eighth Air Force, was placed on call to aid the MAAF. Actually, its help was not needed, and attacks were made by the Eight on only one day - 14 August - against German airfields in the Dijon area.

By D-day Allied air supremacy was so complete that the GAF could be virtually forgotten. How impotent the Luftwaffe had become is evident in the GAF sortie figures in southern France - 60 on D-day, 70 the next day. The sole German reinforcements brought up were 30 Me 109's from Italy. The fighter force still was utterly incapable of interfering with the Allies or protecting its own troops or bases. By week's end the German bomber force had to be moved back to the Lyon area. German bombing operations were attempted at dusk on the 15th through the 19th by small forces of Ju-88's against both shipping and ground targets, with inconspicuous results, although German reconnaissance undoubtedly had been successful in spotting the invasion convoys in Ajaccio harbor on the morning of the 12th.

Another measure of the success of air action was the status of German communication lines. As of D-day only one of the six railway bridges across the Rhone between Lyon and the sea was serviceable - at Avignon, where hasty repairs got one line functioning. This was the only route to the landing area from the west, for both double-track lines paralleling the Rhone between Lyon and Avignon were cut. The main Riviera line into Italy was likewise broken by bombing, while the Mount Cenis line farther north had been blocked by sabotage. At the end of the first week of the invasion, the interdictory situation was unchanged--Avignon was still the only serviceable rail line out of the area.

Best indication of all of the success of the multitudinous air operations was the swift forward rush of the Seventh Army. By week's end there was no question of the overwhelming success of the invasion. Not only had the beachhead been secured but Toulon was surrounded, Marseille almost surrounded, and armored forces, sprinting north, had reached the Rhone below Valence and were heading rapidly for Lyon. German prisoners already totaled 16,500, while total Allied casualties (as of 2400 hours, 19 Aug.) were 1,529 killed or missing and 3,491 wounded. Hard fighting continued in places, but complete conquest of southern France was obviously only a matter of time. On 21 August Lt. Gen Jacob L. Devers, Deputy Commander of AFHQ, wrote to Lt. Gen. Ira C. Eaker, Air C-in-C as follows:

Now that we have settled down for a moment, I wish to tell you what a grand job you, Cannon, Twining, and Saville did and are continuing to do in our present effort in southern France. Your aerial preparation and later support made possible our great gains.

OPERATIONS DURING THE SECOND WEEK

The swift advance continued.

Fanning out westward and northward, the Seventh Army captured Toulon and Marseille in the westward drive, and simultaneously pushed two separate forces northward almost as far as Lyon. One of these spearheads advanced straight north to take Grenoble; the other cut across to the Rhone below Valence, then turned down the vital river to Montelimar and up it toward Lyon. Forward elements of American troops were reported on the Swiss border and others probing eastward had come up against German defenses of the approaches to Italy through the Alpine passes. Meanwhile, French Forces of the Interior had seized Toulouse, cleared Haute Savoie, and mopped up German remnants in dozens of isolated localities. On 28 August AFHQ daily G-2 report commented:

With the capture of Montelimar by American troops yesterday evening, organized enemy resistance throughout southern France, south of a line from Grenoble to Bordeaux has ceased, except only in the southeast corner of France, to the east of the River Var, from which 148 Infantry Division is gradually withdrawing across the Franco-Italian frontier. Very heavy losses were inflicted on the enemy in the elimination of the pocket to the south of Montelimar and it has been claimed, without confirmation, that 15,000 prisoners were captured.

Total prisoners taken through 28 August exceeded 42,000.