Army Air Forces in World War II

The Airborne Operation

Special attention is given to the airborne aspect of the southern France invasion, as distinguished from the part played by the Strategic, Tactical, and Coastal Air Forces. This more detailed description is given for two reasons:

Vertical warfare, a recently developed technique, is worthy of study for its possible use during later stages of the war.
The resounding success of this airborne operation was due to careful planning, adequate build-up and supply, and efficient execution, after formidable handicaps had been overcome.

Though the ultimate success of the airborne operations was an outstanding feature of the invasion of southern France, at the time planning took place trained airborne troops and equipment were conspicuous by their absence.

In February 1944 not one available unit, airborne or troop carrier, was actually prepared for airborne operations. the 51st Troop Carrier Wing, consisting of three groups, had remained in the theater after the inactivation of the XII Troop Carrier Command. But it was the same old headache; only a portion of the wing was available for troop carrier training because of unceasing demands for troop carrier aircraft for special operations, air evacuation, and general transport chores. A few aircraft were attached intermittently to the Airborne Training Center, where a limited program of airborne training was feasible, and this training was accorded a French parachute regiment, two pathfinder platoons, and the American replacements. A British independent parachute brigade was serving in the line as infantry with the Eighth Army; an American parachute battalion and two batteries of a U.S. parachute field artillery regiment were similarly committed to the Fifth Army. No air component, no ground component--a great prospect for an airborne operation.

By May things looked brighter. Following the movement of the 51st Troop Carrier Wing from its Sicilian base to Italy, the parachute units were withdrawn from the line and given intensive training with a full troop carrier group made available in the Salerno area.

The War Department was requested to provide an airborne division for the landings. In lieu of this, several separate units were shipped to the theater. Two of these units were attached to the Airborne Training Center, then located in Sicily, for training, while a third was attached to the Fifth Army for 10 days of battle experience in the line.

Thus by the middle of June the theater had substantial airborne forces on tap. To secure the utmost cohesion, it was decided to move the Airborne Training Center with its attached units, as well as the troop carrier aircraft--now increased to two full groups of the 51st Troop Carrier Wing--to the Rome area. Here was established a compact forward base for all our airborne forces.

ORGANIZATION

Airborne Elements

Toward the first of July the plans for the operation were firmed, including the use of a provisional airborne division made up of the usable units in the theater. Maj. Gen. (then Brig. Gen.) Robert T. Frederick, formerly commander of the First Special Service Force and later commander of the 45th Infantry Division, assumed command of the composite force. Certain units on the troop list were earmarked as additional supporting units to organize a balanced airborne force, and authority was requested of the War Department to activate those units not authorized on the theater troop list. By 7 July initial instructions relative to the Provisional Airborne Division were issued to General Frederick.

The division was then given a 5 percent over strength in personnel by the assignment of parachute filler replacements from the Airborne Training Center. Meanwhile, activation was completed of the divisional headquarters and headquarters company, two additional batteries of field artillery, an airborne signal company, and an antitank company. Because D-day was racing toward them like the end of a runway, it was decided not to attempt to prepare the antitank company for operation, since a Japanese-American company was at hand.

Qualified airborne officers were scarce. As the result of a request for personnel for General Frederick's staff, 36 staff officers arrived in the theater toward the middle of July. Most of them had come from the 13th Airborne Division and a few from the Airborne Center, Camp Mackall, N.C.

For employment in the preparatory stage but not in the operation itself, detachments from a signal operating company, a quartermaster truck company, and some 400 replacements from the Airborne Training Center were placed at General Frederick's disposal.

Troop carrier elements

By the middle of July the 51st Troop Carrier Wing would use two groups for airborne operations; the third was occupied with special duties. To implement the operation, Allied Force Headquarters called for additional troop carrier groups and a minimum of 450 aircraft. On 10 July 1944 orders were issued placing the 50th and 53rd Troop Carrier Wings of the IX Troop Carrier Command, then in the United Kingdom, on temporary duty in the theater. Each wing had four groups of three squadrons, reinforced by self-sustaining administrative and maintenance echelons and by IX Troop Carrier Command Pathfinder Unit, a total of 413 aircraft. In addition to the personnel and equipment moved by organic aircraft, the Air Transport Command transported a medical evacuation squadron, various signal detachments, assorted parapack equipment, and 375 organic glider pilots. Made in eight echelons via Gibraltar and Marrkech, the move required on 2 days, two aircraft being lost en route. Maj. Gen. Paul L. Williams, commanding the two wings from the United Kingdom, arrived on 16 July and activated the Provisional Troop Carrier Air Division, which had all its units stationed at their designated airfields by 20 July, ready to carry our their missions.

With only some 130 operational CG-4A and 50 Horsa gliders to draw on, rapid steps were taken to get enough for the operation. Fortunately, a previous requisition for 350 Waco gliders from the United States had been made; it was necessary only to expedite this request. The British airborne forces had sufficient Horsa gliders to provide for the brigade group. The shipment from America duly arrived and the gliders were assembled in jig time, being readied 10 days before D-day. To provide for two pilots for each glider, 350 additional pilots arrived from Britain. By special air and water transport, some 600,000 pounds of cargo parachutes and aerial delivery equipment arrived in time for the operation, the last large shipment being received on D minus 4.

Concentration of units

A compact airborne base had been organized by the Airborne Training Center and the 51st Troop Carrier Wing at Ciampino and Lido de Roma airfields in the Rome area. By 3 July and advance echelon of the Airborne Training Center was established Ciampino airfield, and by 10 July the center, with its attached units, a parachute battalion and by 10 July the center, with its attached units, a parachute battalion and a glider infantry battalion, was completely located there. Since the divisional staff ordered for General Frederick could not arrive until about 15 July, all other American airborne units in the theater were attached to the Airborne Training Center so that its staff could help to concentrate the airborne troops. Ordered out of the Fifth Army line, the parachute regimental combat team arrive 5 July. Various supporting arms and services placed at the disposal of the Provisional Airborne Division were attached to the Airborne Training Center for instructions. By 17 July General Frederick had moved his headquarters to Lido de Roma airfield, and on 21 July he requested that the name of his provisional organization be changed to "First Airborne Task Force," the use of the term "division" being a misnomer. The Commanding General, Seventh Army concurred and redesignated the unit accordingly.

AIRBORNE PLANNING

Tentative plans had been in the making for some time, but no final detailed pattern for the airborne operation was possible until the First Airborne Task Force ant the Provisional Troop Air Division were organized and ready to function, which brought affairs almost to 20 July. On his arrival the Commanding General, Provisional Troop Carrier Air Division approved the suggested plan of using the previously selected take-off fields, at Ciampino, Galera, Marcigliano, Fabrisi, Viterbo, Tarquinia, Voltone, Monalto, Canino, Orbetello, Ombrone, Grosseto, Fallonica, and Piombino. Subsequently the Provisional Troop Carrier Air Division undertook primarily the planning and coordinating aspects of the operation, involving timing, routes, corridors, rendezvous, and traffic patterns. In general, planning for the selection of drop zones and landing zones and the composition of lifts was left to the airborne and troop carrier units involved.

It was first decided that a predusk airborne assault D minus 1 should not be made, as this might jeopardize the success of the entire operation. Second, it was concluded that it would be neither necessary nor advisable to launch the initial vertical attack after the amphibious assault had begun. The latter decision was reached in view of the wide experience of our troop carrier crews in night take-off operations, and because of the marked improvement in pathfinder technique. Consequently the basic plan called for a predawn assault. One plan, contemplating an immediate staging in Corsica, was rejected because of lack of Corsican airfields, and also because the few available were located on the eastern side of the island, necessitating a flight over 9,000 foot mountain peaks. A further consideration was that such an intermediate staging would require that the airborne corridor be established south of the main naval channel, entailing a dogleg course for the flight.

From numerous conferences the rough plan emerged and was approved about 25 July 1944, calling for the use of the equivalent of an airborne division beginning with the first dropping to be by airborne pathfinder crews at 0323 on D-day. The main parachute lift of 396 plane-loads was to follow, starting at 0412 hours and ending at 0509 hours. The follow-up glider landings, composed of 38 Waco and Horsa gliders, were to take place at 0814 hours and continue until 0822 hours. Later in the same day a total of 42 paratroop plane loads was to be dropped, followed by 335 Waco gliders, starting at 1810 hours and ending at 1859 hours. The automatic air resupply, originally designed as a part of the D-day late afternoon mission, was postponed because insufficient troop carrier aircraft were obtainable and because the Troop Carrier Command could not drop supplies from aircraft towing gliders in the afternoon glider lift. The final plan provided that 112 plane-loads were to be brought in automatically on D-plus 1. The rest of the supplies were to be packed and held for emergency use under Seventh Army control. The troop carrier route was carefully chosen after due consideration of the following factors:

Shortest possible distance
Prominent terrain features
Traffic control for the 10 troop carrier groups
Naval convoy routes
Position of assault beaches
Primary aerial targets
Enemy radar installations
Avoidance of excessive doglegs
Prominent landfalls
Position of charted enemy flak installations

This route logically followed the Italian coast generally from the Rome area to the island of Elba, the first over water check point, continuing to the northern tip of Corsica and proceeding on an azimuth course over naval craft check points to the landfall, just north of Fregus at Agay. Complete coordination was established with the Navy on the position of this corridor, and detailed information concerning it was widely disseminated among naval forces.

Because of high terrain features in the target area, it was decided to drop the paratroops and release the gliders at exceptionally high altitudes, varying from 1,500 to 2,000 feet. Towed glider speeds were set at 120 mph and dropping speed at 110. The formation adopted for the parachute columns was the universal "V of V's" of 9 ships, in serials of 45 aircraft, each with 5-minute intervals head to head between serials. The glider columns adopted a "pair of pairs" formation, echeloned to the right rear with 1,00 feet between pairs in column. Serials made up of 48 aircraft towing gliders in trail were used with 8-minute intervals between serial lead aircraft. Parachute aircraft employed a maximum payload of 5,430 pounds; Horsa gliders, 6,900 pounds; CG4A (Waco) gliders, 3,750 pounds.

Maps and models were hard to get, which made planning difficult. Map shipments were late or faultily made up. There were terrain models on a scale of 1:100,000, but the most useful terrain model, a photo-model on a scale of 1:25,000, could be had only in one copy, which could not serve both the Provisional Troop Carrier Division and the First Airborne Task Force. The original coastal obliques were of little use, since the run-in from the IP was not adequately covered. The blown-up large scale photographs of the dropping zone and landing zone areas were excellent, but they arrived too late for general use. (These late photographs uncovered the element of antiglider poles installed at the landing zones, not revealed by any previous photographs.)

PREOPERATION TRAINING

By the middle of July, nearly all the airborne units to be employed in the operation had been assembled in the Rome area. An intensive final training program had been instituted by the First Airborne Task Force in conjunction with the Airborne Training Center. Of the airborne units to be used, only one parachute battalion and a British parachute brigade had received any recent combined airborne training with the troop carriers. The regimental combat team had just come out of the line with the Fifth Army, as had the parachute field artillery battalion. Other units had but recently arrived overseas and had been given a course in ground and refresher training at the Airborne Training Center.

Particularly urgent was the task of training the newly organized glider-borne troops. A combined glider school was established and instruction in loading and lashing for these troops was started. Upon completion of the course, they were given orientation flights and finally one skeletonized, practice operational landing on a simulated LZ.

The Pathfinder Unit of the Provisional Troop Carrier Air Division conducted joint training with the three airborne pathfinder platoons and tested the radar and radio aids to be used in the operation. This training was divided into three phases, the first being concerned with the technical training with Eureka sets, M/F beacons, lights and panels. Tests were made to locate any deficiencies in either the training or the apparatus. The second phase was devoted to practice by the crews in using the equipment under all possible conditions. The third phase emphasized actual drops with full equipment in which every attempt was made toward the utmost realism. Small groups of follow-up parachute troops were dropped on the prepared drop zones to test the accuracy of pathfinder aids.

Difficulty in repacking the parachutes in time for the operation precluded the staging of realistic, large-scale final exercise. However, practice drops were made with two or three men representing a full "stick" of paratroops, with remaining elements placed in the DZ's to practice assembly. There was just time to squeeze in a combined training exercise with the Navy, in which all vessels carrying waterborne navigational aids were placed in their proper relative positions. A token force of three aircraft per serial was flown by all serial leaders over these aids, observing exact time schedules, routes, and altitudes. Two serials of 36 aircraft each were flown over this same route during daylight to acquaint the naval forces with troop-carrier formations. Further practice runs were made by the troop carriers in conjunction with two fighter groups in order to work out the details of the fighter cover plan and the air-sea rescue plan.

Because the task force was composed of units which had not previously worked together, training of combat teams was further accented for successful operations after landing. Training of each combat team was conducted on terrain carefully selected to duplicate as nearly as possible the combat team's sector in the target area. From the regular replacement depots and the Airborne Training Center were drawn the specialized personnel required, who had then to be specifically trained for their assigned tasks. Fortunately the larger elements of the command, particularly the combat teams, were trained already. Some were battle-seasoned and nearly all were capable of looking out for themselves in a pinch. Thus they could aid the Airborne Task Force as a whole during the training period.

THE OPERATION

The night of D minus 1 was clear and cool in the takeoff areas. The troop carrier units waited at their stations on 10 airfields extending some 150 miles along the Italian peninsula from Ciampino near Rome to Fallonica. Lack of transportation had compelled the bulk of the force to commence moving to dispersal airfields as early as D minus 5. By D minus 2 the shift had been completed. Now, with preparations complete, an air of confident expectancy prevailed.

Anxiously the weather was watched. The date had been unalterably set for 15 August, and weather meant everything. Hill masses and coastal features must be readily identified. A portion of high pressure area, broken off from its North Sea center, had settled over the main target zone, with its threat of accumulating fog or stratus. The forecast was for clear weather to Elba, followed by decreasing visibility u until the DZ's were reached, where it was expected to be 2 to 3 miles. Actually the visibility was less than half a mile. The valley fog, which completely blanketed the early parachute operation, did however lift by 0800 hours in time for the morning glider mission. To make navigation difficulties tougher, the wind was almost 90 degrees off the forecast direction, and infrequent check points over the water route were the navigators' only means of correction. Luckily, the wind did not reach high velocity and was less than 6 mph over the DZ.

Shortly after midnight of 14-15 August the real show began. With everything ready for the green light, the first troop carriers with their load of three pathfinder units took off at 0030. The pathfinder platoons proceeded as a group on a direct line to southern France, making their first landfall just south of Cannes. With PPI sets in all aircraft, the pathfinders proceeded inland as planned, located the drop zones, and dropped their teams at 0323, 0330, and 0334 hours respectively, on DZ's, "O", "A", and "C".

Approximately 1 hour after the pathfinders, the main parachute lift, composed of 396 aircraft in 9 serials averaging 45 aircraft each, took off and proceeded on their courses, using amber downward recognition lights until the final water check point had been crossed. Wing formation lights were also employed, and no instance of friendly naval fire on our planes was reported. No enemy aircraft was encountered. Of particular interest is the fact that some 400 troop carrier aircraft flew in relatively tight formation, under operational strain, for some 500 miles without accident. Training in night formation flying had paid off.

Undoubtedly the radar, radio, and other marker installations were responsible for this flying accuracy. Eurekas had been installed at each wing departure point, the command departure point, the northeast tip of Elba, Giroglia Island (North Corsica), and on three marker beacon boats spaced 30 miles apart on the course from Corsica to the first landfall check point Agay, France. These worked perfectly, with an average reception of 25 miles. Holophane lights, also placed at these positions, aided the navigators to correct their courses against contrary wind currents. Their reception averaged 8 miles until the DZ's were reached, when haze and ground fog made them invisible. MF beacons (the Radio Compass Homing Devices) were installed at Elba, on North Corsica, and on the center marker beacon boat, and were also dropped on the DZ's along with the Eurekas and Holophane lights. Many pilots reported that they received these signals up to 30 miles. The MF beacons often kept the aircraft on beam when they occasionally lost the Rebecca signal on their Eurekas. In many cases, the Rebecca signals exhibited a tendency to drift off the frequency despite constant operational checking. Such evident functional defects in Eureka-Rebecca sets may jeopardize a whole mission.

In general, the parachute drop was fully successful. Approximately 85 percent, a far larger proportion than had been accomplished in previous operations in the European theater, landed on the DZ's or in their immediate vicinity, in areas contiguous to the drops zones, from which terrain the parachute forces could carry out their assigned missions. All this was despite the handicaps of no moon, general haze, and heavy ground fog. An estimated 45 aircraft completely missed their DZ's. Some of these dropped their troops as far as 20 miles from the selected areas.

Among the aircraft which missed the DZ's were 20 in Serial No. 8, which released their troopers prematurely on the red light signal. The only explanation is that a faulty light mechanism in one of the leading craft must have gone on green prematurely and the troops in the lead ship jumped according to this signal. The troops in the following airplanes, seeing those in the leader jump, probably did likewise, jumping while the signal in their own aircraft showed red. Two "sticks" of paratroops landed in the sea off St. Tropez, near Cannes. The remainder made ground landings in the vicinity of these two towns. Although far from the designated DZ, these units organized themselves, made contact with the FFI forces, and proceeded to seize and hold St. Tropez. Approximately 25 aircraft of another group which missed their DZ dropped their troops some 15 miles north of Le Muy near Fayance. Although about 20 miles away from where they belonged, they either undertook individual missions or sought to rejoin their units. By evening of D-day, most of these forces were reassembled on DZ's "A" and "O". Many high-ranking staff members were in this group.

During the drop, DZ "A", general west of Le Muy, tended to merge with DZ "O", slightly northwest of this key town in the Vargennes Valley, causing considerable confusion later in the day. This accidental merging of the two zones created difficulty during the period of bundle recovery, difficulty which was aggravated because the British Parachute Brigade on DZ "O" was using equipment different from that of the U.S. Regimental Combat Team on DZ "A".

The terrain of the DZ's was generally excellent. Both zones covered an area of small, cultivated farms featuring vineyards and orchards. There were very few large buildings, telephone wires, tall trees, or other formidable obstacles. The antiairborne poles set up in the zones had not been sharpened or placed in sufficient density to offer any material obstruction. Probably not more than a squad suffered any injury from these hazards. A total of 175 paratroops, scarcely more than 2 percent, suffered jump casualties. Probably not more than 100 of these were breaks or sprains serious enough to take the men out of action for any considerable time. DZ "C" was a hill mass more rugged than the other zones, but even this rougher ground did not mar the jump's success.

Serial No. 14, first of the glider serials, made up of supporting artillery and antitank weapons for the British Parachute Brigade, left as scheduled for its 0822 landing but was recalled because of heavy overcast. The flight, after circling for nearly 40 minutes, landed at 0900 hours. One glider and tug had to turn back. One glider ditched offshore and another, because of structural defects, disintegrated in mid-air. The stakes that bristled all over the LZ's proved minor obstacles, though they did some damage to the gliders and occasionally to their loads. Small, shallowly planted, and too widely dispersed, the poles frequently served as additional braking power. The French farmers who had been impressed as labor for planting the poles had not served their German masters very efficiently. On an average these poses were 12 feet high and 6 inches thick, driven less that 2 feet into the ground and spaced 30 to 40 feet apart.

The parachute load made up of the 551st parachute Battalion dropped accurately on DZ "A" at 1800 hours as planned. This drop was followed up rapidly by continuous glider serials. Nine gliders were reported to have been released prematurely, four of which made water landings. Prompt action by the Navy save a large percentage of their crews and personnel. The landing skill of our glider pilots was highly satisfactory; although the 1,000-foot towing interval caused considerable jamming over the LZ's, they made excellent landings. Several pilots even ground-looped to avoid obstacles and still brought in their cargoes and personnel safely.

Another reason for crowding over the landing zones was that part of the successive flights sought additional altitude as a result of the normal "accordion movement" of the flights en route. In turn this progressively caused a layer effect which resulted in a greater mass of aircraft being over the LZ's at any one time than had been anticipated. Further difficulty was caused by early glider pilots landing on the best and most obvious sections instead of in their designated localities. Later lifts found their assigned areas almost entirely occupied with gliders, which forced them to seek alternate and less desirable zones. All these factors caused many heavy and short landings which seriously damaged large numbers of gliders. The pilots simply had to dig in on their landings because of limited space. Although these abrupt, heavy landings caused excessive damage to the gliders, the pilots by presence of mind, prompt action, and skillful maneuvers saved may lives and much valuable equipment. It was established by D plus 6 that not more than 125 glider-borne personnel were injured in these landings.

Although not encountered in the operation, it is worthy of note that in Frejus area, outside the drop zones, there was a second type of antiglider obstacle which consisted of small but sturdy sharpened stakes, some 18 inches high, firmly imbedded in the ground and connected by wire, which could easily tear up the bellies of any gliders landing on such terrain.

Less urgent than had been expected was the problem of air resupply. Absence of serious enemy opposition caused ammunition expenditure to fall below the anticipated amount. The initial plan of bringing in the first supplies by air on D-day was changed, so that it was not until 1000 hours on D plus 1 that two troop carrier groups brought in 116 aircraft loaded with supplies. They arrived over the DZ's on schedule but at an altitude well over 2,000 feet, which made accurate dropping extremely difficult. A rather stiff breeze, the high altitude, and the merging of DZ's "O" and "A" placed much of the equipment in the hands of the wrong ground units. Well over 95 percent of the 1,700-odd bundles dropped by parachute landed safely, but much of the specialized equipment failed to reach the units which had requested it. Subsequent missions carrying emergency medical and signal supplies were flown again on the night of D plus 1. Although these drops had to be made at night by pathfinder aids, the success of these missions was above average, except that again the high altitude caused excessive scattering.

GROUND ACTIVITIES

The enemy didn't put up much ground opposition.

More difficult to take than the average objective was Le Muy. The main bridge leading into town was captured well ahead of schedule late on D-day by the British Parachute Brigade, but the town itself was not taken until the morning of D plus 1, as the D-day attack failed to seize the objective and an American glider infantry battalion was later ordered to attack and occupy the town, which was accomplished. The force quickly took Le Mitan, La Motte, Caston, and Les Serres by noon of D-day. Contact was promptly made as planned with the 45th and 36th Infantry Divisions. Elements of one regimental combat team, together with a parachute battalion, took Draguignan, while another parachute battalion assisted the amphibious landing by extending detachments down to the beach following their early landing. Most of the howitzers of the field artillery battalions were functioning shortly after the drop. Similarly, the 4.2 mortar companies and a pack artillery battalion, which came in with gliders, went into action very promptly. The operation was a great boost for parachute field artillery. Almost all the howitzers were in position and firing by noon of D-day, and all were ready for action by dark. With a parachute battalion isolated and inaccessible by road, no other type of artillery could have supported it. The surprise achieved by the landings and the cutting of communication lines by the airborne forces prevented proper employment of enemy mobile reserves, as attested to by the captured general commanding the German corps.

By 18 August the force had commenced to reorganize in the vicinity of Le Muy, following which it proceeded along the Riviera toward Cannes, Nice, and the Italian border. The British Parachute Brigade was taken out of action and preparations were made to return it to its base in the Rome area for further possible airborne operational use. The First Special Service Force replaced the British brigade, and the Airborne Task Force then continued to advance along the coast meeting determined rear-guard opposition. These operations of the Task Force toward the Franco-Italian border were not restricted to the coast, but extended to a point about 65 miles inland. As has always been the case when airborne troops are retained in the line in an offensive role, they experienced backbreaking difficulty in transporting their heavy supporting arms and ammunition. The fluid, rapid advance of the Seventh Army as a whole made it hard to provide the necessary vehicles for the force. As a result, the paratroopers in many cases hauled their pack 75's for 60 or 70 miles over the rugged Riviera coastline. Fortunately a number of captured enemy vehicles, together with organic transport brought in by gliders, made the movement possible.

The hostile activity encountered was at no time sufficiently stern to test the full fighting capabilities of the force.

STATISTICS

During the operation the Provisional Troop Carrier Air Division flew 987 sorties and carried 9,000 airborne personnel, 221 jeeps, and 213 artillery pieces. The sorties flown also included 407 towed gliders and carried 2,365,254 pounds of equipment into the battle area for the First Airborne Task Force. Only 1 aircraft was lost as a result of the operation itself, and losses from the period of movement from the United Kingdom to the close of the operation totaled 9. No troop carrier personnel other than glider pilots were known to have been killed; 4 were listed as missing and 16 were hospitalized. The balance of the 746 dispatched on the operation returned to their organization.

With respect to airborne units, a total of 434 United States airborne personnel were listed as killed, captured, or missing in action by 20 August. In addition 292 were hospitalized. Early reports indicated that the British Parachute Brigade listed 181 men as missing in action and 130 men hospitalized. Later reports indicated that 52 parachute troops of the British brigade had definitely been killed. Five hundred replacements had been requested by the United States parachute units and 126 by the British brigade. In the first 2 days of action, more than 1,000 prisoners had been taken by the American units and nearly 350 by the British brigade. By 23 August, this figure was well over 2,000. The total jump and glider injuries amounted to 283, or approximately 3 percent of the personnel involved.

Recovery of parachutes for personnel and cargo can be expected to be very low. As of 1 September, it was apparent that not more than 1,000 parachutes could be sent to the Rome base for salvage and repair. Similarly, the number of gliders which can be used again is always small. It was learned that fewer than 50 gliders of the 407 could be salvaged without excessive cost.

SUMMARY

Without a doubt, this airborne operation was the most successful attempted up to that time in the European theater. The commanders of both the airborne and the troop carrier units and their subordinates deserve full credit for their excellent execution of the mission. The results and experiences of this operation are believed to be of value to all theaters in avoiding mistakes and improving techniques.