Planning the Operation

England was bulging with troops. Along the narrow lanes dispatch riders dashed. Tanks lumbered over the roads; assault craft were piled at distribution points; frequent and elaborate exercises were being staged. Already there had been practice alerts, when all personnel were required to be at their bases. Newspapers speculated, the German press and radio exulted that the Allies had missed the most favorable tides and could not assault for another month. Tension ran high.

For months there had bee good-natured badgering between members of the Eight and Ninth Air Forces, who in turn had banded together when assailed by ground force personnel. Now they were beginning to realize that they were all members of a bigger team, an outfit which would soon be called upon to conduct history's greatest military operation.

Forgotten now were differences between strategic and tactical, between ground and air, between Army and Navy, between Americans and their Allies. All were welded into one compact, devastating fist, set to deliver the Sunday punch.

There are more facets to the Normandy invasion that to a finely cut diamond. Volumes and sets of volumes will be written about it. This booklet considers only one, the tactical employment of the Eighth Air Force heavy bombers before and during the invasion and the resultant change in the disposition and use of Eighth Air Force fighters.

It required careful planning. Here are shown the planning steps, with the problems which arose and demanded workable solution. Also included is a summary of Eighth Air Force operations from D minus 4 to D plus 11.

Like the other participating components, the Eighth Air Force, commanded by Lt. Gen. James H. Doolittle, did its part in highly creditable fashion.

The plan for invasion envisaged air operations on a comprehensive and unprecedented scale. These were divided into two phases. The aim of the first was the attainment of Allied air supremacy and destruction of the enemy's productive capacity to the point where, once the projected foothold on the Continent had been secured, overwhelming materiel superiority could be brought to bear. The second phase had as its objective air cooperation with the ground assault.

A vital share in the preparatory operations was allotted to the strategic bomber forces of the Royal Air Force and the U.S. Eighth Air Force. In the second phase the Ninth Air Force and the Second Tactical Air Force (RAF) were in the forefront, but again the strategic forces made important contributions.

On 15 April 1944 the overall air plan for the employment of all British-based aircraft in cooperation with the forthcoming invasion of France was formally issued by Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Air Force, having been originally drafted some 6 weeks earlier. It contained detailed provisions for operations and furnished the basis for extensive preparations by the Eighth Air Force to fulfill its considerable proportion of the overall assignments. A directive from confirmed earlier informal directions requiring the rendition by the Eighth Air Force of maximum cooperation according to provisions of the air plan and related documents.

Between 15 April and 6 June practically everybody had a hand in formulating the plan, which changed so often and so much its final form was only a distant relative of the original. The commanders of all the principal air, ground, and naval forces in the theater worked on it. Details were suggested, developed, polished by committees of staff representatives and technical experts. When formally published, it represented the knowledge and opinions of men who knew their jobs. A brief chronology of the more important planning phases can be traced as follows:

1. The AEAF was created on 15 November 1943, with Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory designated as Air Commander in Chief. Headquarters, AEAF, was thereafter represented at the 21st Army Group meetings, and the basic requirements of air cooperation was established, subject to the general policies already formulated by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

2. A Joint Planning Committee was formed on 15 December 1943 by Headquarters, 21st Army Group, to consider the relationship of air power to the assault plan, the delay of enemy reserves, coordination quarters, AEAF, became fully organized and staffed, an Operations Plans Section was constructed, which gradually took over the functions of the Joint Planning Committee.

3. Of more immediate significance to the Eighth Air Force was the formation on 10 January 1944 of the AEAF Bombing Committee to plan specifically the employment of bomber aircraft. Principal considerations were:

a. Suitability of targets for bombing
b. Relationship of bombing commitments to the scale of effort estimated to be available
c. Allocation of priorities to the various commitments
d. Apportionment of the available bomber effort

Supplementing the AEAF Bombing Committee almost from the start was the Operational Planning Committee, consisting of certain members of the first-named body plus representatives of the 21st Army Group and each of the air forces involved. The work of the two committees was so closely interrelated that no separate assessment of their contributions toward the final detailed plans is possible. The function of both was to transform into concise and exact operational programs the general policies agreed upon by the air, ground and naval commanders. Designated to represent the Eighth Air Force on the Operational Planning Committee was a senior operations controller, but as the earlier meetings concerned primarily the commitments of the tactical air forces, his attendance was required only occasionally until 15 April 1944. Before and during this period, specific problems pertaining to heavy-bomber operations were often submitted by letter to USSTAF or Eighth Air Force for solution.

By 25 May, details of the Eighth Air Force program were largely completed. On 29 May, Air Chief Marshal Leigh-Mallory requested each headquarters concerned to appoint a regular member of the committee, prepared to meet daily. Thereafter until 30 June, the Eighth Air Force representative was in constant attendance day and night.

To facilitate complete understanding between the Eighth Air Force and the principal Army headquarters, SHAEF granted permission for direct contact between USSATF and Eighth Air Force representatives, on the one had, and American British Army staff officers, on the other. Two such meetings were arranged, at which very important concrete agreements were reached. The first involved the commander and staff of the American First Army Artillery, and the second was with staff officers of the I and XXX Army Corps of the British Second Army. Final coordination of air activities was achieved through informal meetings among representatives of the various commands.

Daily meetings of air force commanders were begun on D minus 3 and continued throughout the critical period of the invasion. Final alterations in plans were considered and decided upon, as well as the transitory problems arising as the invasion forces moved inland after the initial foothold had been secured.