German Air Force Reaction to the Airborne Landings

Just as the GAF failed to meet the challenge of the Normandy invasion, so it made a miserable showing against the Netherlands airborne assault. Strained by aircraft and fuel shortages, forced to bring planes from inconveniently distant points, harried by commitments in other sectors, the Luftwaffe could not mount the furious defensive effort called for by so ominous a development. The following review, covering the period 17-23 September, gives an account of this relatively feeble attempt to smash the forces of the FAAA from the air.

The state of the weather was certainly a greater handicap to the Allies than to the enemy. While it prevented the GAF from putting up a maximum effort, it also kept the Allies from bringing to bear the full weight of their air superiority, as well as grievously hampering the resupply and reinforcement.

Although the GAF was quick to identify the main landing and drop areas, its reaction on the first day was slow. This was probably due to the fact that the German fighter forces based nearest to the landing points had already been committed to operations elsewhere, so that other units had to be pressed into service from localities as far away as Darmstadt. With the sudden extension of the battle area in Holland, the Germans certainly appraised the landings as a very serious threat. this led to employment on tactical tasks of units which had previously been engaged in the strategic defense of Germany against heavy-bomber raids, and involved their transfer from central Germany. Elements of these new forces were identified in tactical operations over Holland by 21 September. The extent to which this reinforcement of the western tactical forces was planned appears to have been about 300 aircraft, and represents a reversal of the former GAF policy of sacrificing tactical cooperation with an army in favor of defense of the homeland against daylight bombing. However, despite this strong numerical reinforcement in fighters, the scale of effort over Holland was in no way commensurate with the evident sacrifice entailed in home defense. One reason for this was the need to maintain a fairly large force, approximately 200 aircraft, to meet Allied pressure in the Nancy-Metz sector. There is no indication of appreciable fighter activity in the Aachen-Maastricht area during the period under review.

Allied losses through interception by fighters were comparatively small and were confined to 1 day, 21 September. In the main, enemy fighters were used initially in attempts to attack gliders and transports but concentrated later upon the strafing of gliders and landed troops in an effort to prevent their successful deployment.

Night bomber operations were carried out on only 2 nights, the 18th and 19th (D plus 1 and D plus 2), with 50 and 100 sorties respectively. The targets were along the Escaut Canal and at Eindhoven. Weather was doubtless the deciding factor in limiting these efforts.

Night fighters were out in strength only on the second night (18/19), on free-lance patrol over Holland, evidently anticipating the dropping of reinforcements and supplies by night. There is no  evidence that they were employed on ground strafing operations either by day or by night.

An unusual feature was the use of a small number of twin-engine fighters on night reconnaissance of the southern North Sea. Presumably the purpose of this was to obtain early information of any attempt to supplement the air landings by a seaborne invasion of the Netherlands islands.