Narrative of the Operation - Statistics

The following tabulation gives a graphic picture of the statistics of the operation, covering the period 17 September-26 September inclusive: 1

Dispatched Successful Lost E/A
Claims 1		 Casualties

Dropped or Landed
Troops Vehicles Artillery
Weapons		 Equipment & Supplies
(tons) 2
IX TCC

A/C 4,242

 3,880 98 - - - - - -

G 1,899

 1,635 137

-

 454 30,481 1,001 463 3,559
38 and 46 Groups A/C 1,340 1,200 55 - - - - - -
G 699 627 2

-

 294 4,395 926 105 1,668
8 AF 4,269 3,943 58 139 87 - - - -
9 AF 501 385 2

-

 2 - - - -
2 TAF 898 860 13 15 3  13 (4) (4) (4) (4)
ADGB 1,746 1,677 12 5 12 (4) (4) (4) (4)
Totals A/C 12,996 11,945 238 - - - - - -
G 2,598 2,262 139 159 862 34,876 1,927 568 5  5,227

1 A/C Destroyed Only
2 Includes resupply operation by 8 AF 2 Div
3 Estimated minimum
4 British figures do not include 392 A/C dispatched to target area on D-day morning and the night preceding. 2 of these were lost
5 Includes gasoline

Figures alone cannot reflect the collateral costs of the operation, which must be considered in terms of several factors. For example while the airborne and troop carrier troops involved would have had to be used on any operation of similar size, the use of virtually all the FAAA resources for this operation dissipated a serious threat against which the Germans had had to be continually on guard. Thus one cost was the sacrifice of this menace to enemy plans.

Stand by status and operational use of IX TCC aircraft for these airborne landings, together with their planned predecessors, which in each case called for marshaling and complete immobilization of IX TCC, further complicated a ticklish supply situation by cutting out much of available air supply to the Continent. CATOR, which handled over all air supply through a priority control office, arranged to supply by C-47's some 20,000 tons to the Continent during September. Had the airborne operations not been contemplated, CATOR estimated that, considering existing limitations in weather restrictions, inadequate airfields, loading facilities, scarcity of aviation gasoline, etc., 45,000 tons could have been delivered, of which 25,000 tons could have gone to Lt. Gens. Courtney H. Hodges and George S. Patton, Jr. At the time, General Bradley did not desire to resume the offensive until he had a 30,000 ton stockpile, which by sea, rail, and truck was accruing at a rate of 1,000 tons daily.

While about 250 heavy bombers were used for air supply, the principal cost of heavy bomber missions resulted from the diversion of Eighth Air Force fighters flying escort. Lt. Gen. James H. Doolittle estimates this costs as the equivalent of 6 heavy bomber missions, of which 4 could have been of major size. Of the 17 missions flown during September, 2 were further reduced in size because of fighter diversion to the airborne landings. Operations of tactical air forces cannot be charged to the airborne assault any more than to other ground activity which might have been conducted in its stead

 1 Photo and weather reconnaissance not included