Plans of the IX Troop Carrier Command

After an initial study of the capabilities of IX TCC, with application to the problem in hand, a coordinating conference was called of all air and airborne commanders involved, with a view to forming the tactical plan. At this meeting the over-all problem was studied and all commanders voiced their opinions.

Selection of staging airfields was based on the then location of troop carrier fields, distance from target areas, tactical composition of airborne units, suitability for marshaling gliders, and location of supplies for emergency resupply missions to airborne troops. Airborne troop units were made up to coincide with the tactical air formation  desired by the troop carrier forces. A few exceptions were made from the actual number of aircraft per serial desired by IX TCC, when maintaining the desired number for the air serial would have meant poor tactical composition on the ground.

Troop carrier routes. -- Routing of troop carrier aircraft was based on the following factors:

1. Shortest distance to target area with consideration given to prominent terrain features.

2. Traffic control patterns for IX TCC and RAF units.

3. Inner artillery zone and balloon areas in United Kingdom.

4. Enemy antiaircraft and searchlight batteries.

5. Avoidance of dog-leg turns over water.

6. Choice of prominent, irregular coast line for making landfall.

7. Shortest distance over hostile territory.

It was decided to choose two routes to the target area: one to the north, traveling over enemy territory from the coast to the target area; the other to the south, traveling over friendly territory from the coast on, and through a corridor held by our own forces. This was done to provide greater area to cover both courses. Proof  of the advisability of such a plan was seen on D plus 1 when, with the southern route rendered impassable by weather, the northern way was unaffected.

Navigational aids.--Location and types of navigational aids were selected in the same manner as for night operations. Even though this was a daylight mission, the problem of navigation was to be made as simple as possible. For security reasons each site was given a code name. Call signs were assigned to the site. Tests and analyses of navigational sites were made in an effort toward perfect performance.

At the wing assembly points were Eureka beacons, M/F beacons, and searchlight cones. Aids of this nature were used to great advantage as rendezvous points for group and serial formations, and as wing departure points. Departure points on the English coast, where serials started their North Sea crossings, were equipped with Eureka beacons, M/F beacons, and occults flashing the assigned code letters. Along the routes and approximately halfway between friendly and enemy coasts were stationed two marker boats. Each of these carried a Eureka beacon and a green holophane light, sending the assigned code letter. These boats, serving as definite fixes over the water, contributed greatly to the accuracy of arrival times over target areas. Since Holland was enemy-held, landfall on the Dutch coast was made by dead reckoning, plus special radar equipment in lead aircraft. Prior to the main force's arrival at drop zones (DZ) and landing zones (LZ), pathfinder teams established Eureka beacons, M/F beacons, panels, and colored smoke. These navigational aids served for identification of individual DZ's and LZ's, as well as for homing purposes for serial leaders. From the boat markers pathfinder crews located the target areas by means of special radar equipment.

Timing.--Timing of troop carrier aircraft was based on the following factors:

1. To provide safe intervals between serials.

2. To provide for the shortest possible column time length.

3. To allow sufficient time on ground for servicing aircraft and resting combat crews between missions.

4. To gain best advantage from element of surprise.

5. To put parachute troops in enough ahead of gliders to secure glider LZ's

6. To have a special number of gliders in as early possible after parachutists in order to provide troops with early artillery support.

7. To have parachute serial spaced 4 minutes head to head and glider serials 7 minutes head to head.

Timing schedules used clock time and were based on H-hour, in case H-hour was changed because of weather or operational reasons.  A quick calculation then could be made to obtain times over turning points, initial point (IP), and drop and release times.

Altitudes.--Altitudes were chosen with regard to avoiding small arms fire, heavy antiaircraft fire, minimum safe altitude for drops and releases, and clearance of aircraft coming in with those returning from the target area:

Speeds flown.--

Corrected speeds were given 2 hours prior to each mission, after final winds and altimeter settings had been received.

Rope drop.--Glider tugs were instructed to drop ropes in predetermined drop zones common to all aircraft on return after release. Each tug dropped its rope immediately after clearing the LZ, thus facilitating rope recovery.

Pay loads.--The following  maximum pay loads were established for the operation:

Formations.--Parachute aircraft were to fly in 9-plane vee of vees in serial up to 45 aircraft, in trail, with 4-minute intervals head to head between serial lead aircraft. The formation for glider columns was pairs of pairs, echeloned to the right, serial up to 48 aircraft towing glider in trail, with 7-minute intervals between serial lead aircraft. These intervals and formation patterns provided for sufficient maneuverability of columns  and gave excellent concentration to paratroops and gliders on the ground in the target area.

In determining the formations to be used, every effort was made to keep the column time length at a minimum to insure the greatest benefit from fighter escort and permit the shortest time over enemy territory. Since the operation was to take place by daylight, it was possible to tighten the formation intervals, beyond the minimum established for night missions, to 4 minutes head to head between serial lead aircraft in paratroop formations and to 7 minutes head to head between glider formations. Besides shortening the intervals,  the planners established tree parallel streams to the target region. A left-hand stream went from the IP to DZ's and LZ's in the Arnhem vicinity with paratroops and equipment for the British 1st Airborne Division; aircraft in the center stream were to fly from the IP to DZ's and LZ's in the neighborhood of Nijmegen with paratroops and glider troops of the United States 82d Airborne Division; and in the Eindhoven area with paratroops and glider troops of the United States 101st Airborne Division. Each of the outside lanes was 1 1/2  miles from center stream. A fourth channel was provided for aircraft of 38 and 46 Groups, which were to take the center stream at 1,000 feet greater altitude.

Emergency landing fields.--Arrangements were made for emergency landing strips by notifying all airdromes in operation in East Anglia, as well as landing strips in northwestern France and in Belgium. East Anglian airdromes specifically under IX TCC control were at Chipping Ongar and Boreham.

Evasive action.--In order to insure the maximum possible concentration on the ground for paratroops and gliders, combat crews were to take no evasive action between  the IP and the DZ's and LZ's.

Failure to release or drop.--It was the responsibility of wing and group commanders to enforce the policy that no paratroops or gliders were to be returned to staging airfields, that all paratroops dropped and all gliders released in the target region.

Air cover.--Air cover for troop carrier forces and airborne troops was provided by the United States Eighth and Ninth Air Forces, and by RAF's Air Defense  of Great Britain (ADBG), Second Tactical Air Force (2d TAF), Coastal Command, and Bomber Command. Their specific assignments were:

Eighth Air Force--Escort and neutralization of flak from IP's to DZ's and LZ's, and resupply to airborne troops on D plus 1.

Ninth Air Force and 2d TAF--Air cover for airborne troops after drop.

ADGB--Escort and flak neutralization from all landfall to IP's.

Coastal Command--Diversionary missions.

Bomber Command--Diversionary missions and bombing of enemy installations.

2d TAF--Photo reconnaissance of target areas

Antiaircraft artillery control procedure.--All Allied agencies, air, ground, and sea, were informed of the detailed flight plan of the troop carrier columns. Orders were issued to all Allied troops in the vicinities of the routes and targets not to fire on any aircraft until further notice.