Notes on Organization, Tactics, and Technique
The foregoing pages have given an account of the exploits of the XIX TAC-Third Army air-ground team, which wrote an entirely new page in the history of warfare. Behind this impressive success lies a story of preparation and planning, of experimentation, of intelligent improvisation. Some aspects of these often unsung activities are considered below.
General.--The operations of XIX TAC in the field proved the basic concepts of FM 100-20 to be fundamentally sound.
The order of priority of tactical missions was:
- Attainment and maintenance of air superiority
- Isolation of the battlefield
- Close air cooperation with ground units in combat
Air liaison officers.--Air liaison officers were used by XIX TAC and proved of extremely great value. However, it became apparent in the early stages of rapid advance of Army divisions that one air cooperation party per armored division was inadequate. The armored divisions of the Third Army habitually advanced in two or three columns, each making up a combat command. Because of their physical separation and rapid movement, it was found necessary to provide an air cooperation party for each combat command. A sufficient number of air cooperation parties, complete with equipment and operating personnel, to work with each advancing column is an arrangement which serves best to achieve the desired results. In the campaign here discussed such parties were improvised.
Communications.--Wire communications for the Command, and control among the various elements of XIX TAC, proved unsatisfactory under conditions of rapid advance. This resulted from long lines of communication; cutting of lines by saboteurs; shortage of wire; shortage of repeater and carrier equipment; shortage of maintenance, construction, and operating personnel. These were formidable obstacles which make all the more admirable the ability of XIX TAC to maintain even sketchy communications throughout a kaleidoscopic campaign.
Tactical air control.--The assignment and operation of a fighter control center with fighter wings proved unsatisfactory for offensive tactical air control purposes. To overcome this, all aircraft warning units, fighter control squadrons, and radio intercept service were organized into a provisional tactical control group and placed directly under the control of Advanced Headquarters XIX TAC. Elements of the tactical control group were maintained very close behind the advanced ground troops and close to, but not necessarily with, the Advanced Tactical Air Command headquarters.
Supply and transportation.--An adequate air service command and aviation engineer command are absolutely essential to the mobile tactical air force and have proved their worth in the European theater. Because of the pooling of motor transportation in the communications zone, the air service command has not always been able adequately to supply or move the tactical units. General Weyland held the belief that the air service command in the theater should have sufficient motor transport to move and supply the tactical units over distances up to 300 miles, and that the service team should be an organic part of the combat group in a mobile tactical air command.
Airdrome squadrons.--Airdrome squadrons proved invaluable in maintaining tactical operations by refueling and rearming units at advanced landing grounds. They also proved their worth in temporarily servicing tactical groups at new airdromes while the groups' personnel was being leapfrogged forward.
P-47 aircraft and API ammunition.--The P-47 airplane has been extensively used with very great success in strafing locomotives, trains, motor transport, horse-drawn transport, and armored vehicles. Armor piercing, incendiary ammunition was shown to be far more effective on these strafing operations than mixed loading of two armor-piercing, two incendiary, and one tracer. Likewise, it has been found much more effective in use against hostile aircraft in the air and on the ground.
Rockets.--XIX TAC thoroughly tested the trackless, high-velocity, 5-inch rocket under combat conditions. It was accurate and especially effective against tanks, armored vehicles, locomotives, and gun positions. It was found to add little to the plane in weight and to detract little in speed and, considering its flexibility, it was regarded by XIX TAC as an extremely valuable tactical weapon.
Armored-column cover.--The practice of assigning to one fighter-bomber group the task of providing continuous cover for one armored column during daylight hours proved most satisfactory. Groups were directed to furnish 8 to 12 aircraft for cover to armored columns. As each flight approached, the leader checked in by radio with the flight leader being released, also with the air-cooperation-party radio on the ground. Suitable targets left to be attacked were passed to the flight picking up the patrol. Standing operating procedure was for flights to patrol ahead to a distance of 35 miles, seeking out possible strongpoints or pockets of resistance which might hamper the forward movement of our armor. Such targets were attacked and were also reported to the armored column.
The German camouflage discipline was excellent After 15 or 20 missions, however, pilots could pick out irregularities of shadow along roads, which disclosed the presence of the enemy.
Both the number of planes, 8 or 12, and their bomb loads varied with the amount of enemy armor opposing the movement of our column and with the likelihood of encountering enemy aircraft. For example, in the area between Le Mans and Fontainebleau, where few thick skinned enemy vehicles were met, it was possible almost to dispense with carrying bombs, since the desired results could be obtained by strafing. In the Mantes-Gassicourt region, close to Paris and the enemy's fighter fields, only one-third of our aircraft were bombed up, because of the frequency of brushes with enemy planes.
It was conclusively proved that our .50 -caliber API ammunition could destroy enemy armor, and did so. Pilots repeatedly reported tanks being set afire by low-altitude strafing from the rear. Evidently ricochet bullets found their way into the engine section through exhaust and cooling vents.
Air ground communications.--At the outset of the campaign, "C" Channel was used for all communication between aircraft and ground forces. However, this channel proved to be badly overcrowded, and early communication difficulties were overcome by assigning frequencies as follows: Button A--group frequency and homing; Button B--air-ground communication with VIII and XII Corps; Button C--communications with all aircraft of Ninth Air Force; Button D--air-ground communication with XV and XX Corps.
Altitude of operations.--Operations under 3,500 feet were found to be impractical for fighter-bombers because of the damage inflicted by the intense light flak encountered over concentrations of enemy troops. The P-51 was much more susceptible to serious damage by light flak than the P-47, because of the former's liquid-cooled engine and its somewhat lighter construction.
Minimum weather.--For dive bombing, XIX TAC operations required a 5,000 foot ceiling with broken cloud. For armed reconnaissance the minimum was 3,500 feet with broken cloud. For take-off from base, minimum conditions were 1,000-foot ceiling and 3-mile visibility.
Frequency of operation.--Two group missions, or six squadron missions, per day per group proved to be the most desirable average scale of effort. XIX TAC squadrons had been reduced in number from 16 to 12 planes, since this gave increased flexibility and was adequate for any task encountered. Two group sorties daily thus meant 72 individual aircraft sorties, and it was found that this scale of effort could be maintained day in and day out without affecting maintenance. As a general policy, each group was allowed one day off for maintenance every 7 to 10 days. Also, two missions with 12-plane squadrons were the maximum that could be supported with the flow of replacement aircraft.
Bomb-loading.--The most frequent loading consisted of 500-pound general-purpose bombs with instantaneous fuze. This bomb was found suitable against most military installations not protected by reinforced concrete or heavy masonry. The 500-pound general-purpose bomb was also used satisfactorily, with 8- to 11-second delay fuze, for cutting railway lines, the bomb being driven into the side of an embankment by minimum-altitude skip-bombing methods. With a 6-to 12-hour delay fuze, the same bomb was dropped on highways to discourage movement at night. When the Germans were trying to escape across the Seine, these bombs, with long-delay fuzing, were dropped into the water close to the ferry slips.
Fragmentation bombs were used less extensively than the 500-pound GP because this swift, "end run" type of campaign offered fewer opportunities for their effective employment. The Argentan pocket was an outstanding exception; fragmentation bombs were used there with excellent results. Fragmentation clusters and, to a smaller extent, the 260-pound antipersonnel fragmentation bomb, were employed against personnel and thin-skinned vehicles.
Napalm was found to be a very good weapon if properly employed on suitable targets. It has two important advantages among others; it can be dropped from a low altitude without danger to the aircraft, and it completely smothers the target with intense flames, burning everything combustible and destroying personnel by anoxia, carbon monoxide poisoning, and burning. It is particularly adapted to attack on deep shelters, because of its effect upon the ventilating system. In attacks on gun positions the effectiveness of artillery pieces was impaired or destroyed by Napalm's intense heat. For Napalm, the regular belly tank (usually the 150-gallon type) was used, with a detonator but no fins. Dropping was done from minimum altitude by visual methods, without use of a sight.
Virtually no 1,000-pound bombs were used during the mobile warfare of August, two 500-pound bombs proving more effective for most purposes.
Radius of action. Effective radius for the P-47 with full bomb load but without spare tank was 200 miles; the 150-gallon tank increased this to 350 miles. For the P-51 the radius was 325 miles on fighter sweeps without tanks, or about 600 miles with 150-gallon tank, although so much range was rarely needed in tactical operations of the type conducted by XIX TAC.
Airfield surface.--A minimum of 5,000 feet proved necessary for taking off with full tank and two 500-pound bombs, since most XIX TAC fields had a dip or roll and acceleration was not so rapid as on a hard-surfaced runway. Hessian waterproof material was very satisfactory when laid on a graded surface. Considerably better than such landing grounds, however, were established airfields captured from the Germans and repaired, such as those at Rennes, Chateaudun, and St. Dizier. Such fields had extensive dispersal areas and were large enough to accommodate two groups.
Flank protection.--The swift pace of General Patton's advance posed many new problems, one of the most demanding of which was protection of the long flank along the Loire. The task of watching that flank and preventing any dangerous concentration was turned over entirely to the air, an important decision which, as has been noted, marked a forward stride in the history of warfare. This task was successfully carried out by vigilant tactical and photographic reconnaissance backed by fighter bombers, which were continually attacking enemy troops and transport, interdicting movements by road and rail, and keeping the enemy constantly off balance so that small units had little chance to "snowball" into effective opposition. The full results of these efforts were not apparent until the middle of September, when the German general commanding 20,000 troops south of the Loire surrendered, with all his officers and men, to the U.S. Ninth Army and to the Commanding General, XIX TAC. His capitulation resulted from three factors: relentless air attack, effective action by the French Forces of the Interior, and the cutting of the only remaining escape route by the junction of the U.S. Third and Seventh Armies.
Operations on fronts 350 miles apart.--When Brest still held out, and the Third Army's main attack meanwhile moved well to the east of Paris, XIX TAC found itself operating simultaneously on fronts 350 miles apart. This proved entirely practical because of the flexibility and range of air power.
Situation map.--So rapid was the advance and so wide the extent of the front that it was found impracticable to continue maintaining the general situation on a map of 1:100,00 scale. General Patton's spearheads were constantly running off the map, even though it was maintained on boards aggregating 16 feet long and 8 feet high. Accordingly, the 1:250,000 map was substituted and served satisfactorily.
Reconnaissance and intelligence.--Reconnaissance, intelligence technique, and teamwork between the A-3 and A-2 sections improved materially in the course of the month, an improvement reflected in the results achieved in hunting down the enemy's air force and catching his aircraft on the ground, in attacking enemy transport attempting to escape into Germany from south of the Loire, and in providing direct cooperation with the ground forces.
