The Twelfth Air Force in the Tunisian Campaign

Before the Northwest African invasion was fully decided upon, powerful arguments had been advanced for the inclusion of Tunisia in the initial landings. The planners, however, had had to consider four factors:

1. The small number of Allied troops available, which would be spread even thinner if Tunisia were included.

2. The necessity of maintaining a large holding force in Morocco lest the Axis strike through Spanish Morocco.

3. The possible hostility of the French military and naval establishments in Morocco.

4. The overwhelming air superiority of the Axis over the straits between the Tunisian coast and Sardinia and Sicily, which might make disastrous any Allied landing attempt.

In the end it had been decided that it would be wiser to insure the firm control of Morocco and Algiers, a decision in which the enemy threat to Morocco had been the deciding factor. But it was planned that as soon as control of Algiers was gained light mobile elements would be pushed toward Tunis and Bizerte as rapidly as possible.

For a long time it will be debated whether the more audacious course would have been the wiser. Admiral Cunningham spoke for himself and an appreciable number of others when he said, "It is a matter of lasting regret to me that the bolder conception for initial assault in that area (Tunisia) was not implemented. Had we been prepared to throw even a small force into the eastward parts, the Axis would have been forestalled in their first token occupation and success would have been complete. They were surprised and off their balance. We failed to give the final push which tipped the scales."

The task of getting control of Tunisia was complicated by many difficulties:

1. Terrain--The country between Algiers and Tunis was extremely rugged, with high mountains and narrow valleys which were prohibitive to armored action.

2. Transportation.--The roads were few, and few of these were hard-surfaced. Three railroads led from Constantine into Tunisia, but one of these was broken by a 20-mile gap through mountainous terrain which had to be negotiated by motor vehicles. Moreover, all the railways were in disrepair and rolling stock was scarce and unreliable. The Allies did not possess, nor could they obtain at once, the motor transport necessary to rush even the few available combat units and their necessary supplies to the region of prospective action near Tunis and Bizerte.

3. Air cooperation.--There were no hard-surfaced airfields in the intermediate area; moreover, most of the available fighters were short-range and quite unable to cover effectively the advance spearheads as they  approached Tunis and Bizerte.

4. Weather.--Northern Tunisia is a region of heavy winter rains, which usually begin in late November and continue through February. If the advance failed to seize Tunis and Bizerte before the rains began, it was inevitable that roads and airfields would be reduced to quagmires, and transportation and air cover would be greatly hampered if not actually interdicted.

Nevertheless an all-our effort was made to improve such opportunities as existed and to reach the objective fore the rains began. The plan adopted was threefold:

1. Naval units and landing forces were to be sent eastward to capture the ports and airfields in the vicinities of Bougie, Djidjelli, Philippeville, Bone, and La Calle.

2. Paratroops were to drop on the airfields at Bone, Souk-el-Arba, and Youks-les-Bains.

3. Infantry and armored units were to be rushed by road and rail to points as far within Tunisia as possible. For this effort there were initially available the equivalent of one infantry division and one tank regiment, both under strength.

Because the French in Tunis did not oppose the enemy landings, which began the day after the Allied invasions, by 18 November 1942 the Germans were moving out of Tunis to establish a front against the advancing British. Every passing day saw new Axis aviation units established on the airdromes and new ground forces landing from ships, transport aircraft, and gliders, and spreading across the western hills. In November alone it was said that more tha 1,200 Ju-52 landings were made at Bizerte. By the end of November, the moment of crisis, Axis troops of all categories numbered about 20,000 well-equipped men. Not only did the enemy have the advantage of being within 100 miles of his Sicilian bases, across a strip of water which he rigidly controlled, but the airdromes in eastern Tunisia were suitable for all-weather use, an incalculable advantage during the ensuing rainy season.

Operating from Algiers, the British seized control of all the ports and airfields along the coast as far as La Calle, landing troops from the sea under cover of naval guns and the Fleet Air Arm, and bringing in fighter squadrons at the earliest possible moment. These movements were accomplished under difficulties, as Axis planes, probably based on Sardinia, attacked at all times of the day and night. One of the first assaults was upon Bougie, where three U. S. combat loaders were sunk; a British carrier was slightly damaged, but its aircraft brought down 11 enemy planes for the loss of three.