Air Victories and Losses, 8 November 1942 - 18 February 1943

The following table, from NAAF Air Intelligence Weekly Summary, No. 29, does not include aircraft destroyed and damaged on the ground, but does include USAAF planes destroyed in the air or missing more than one week:

The reorganization planned at the Casablanca Conference was implemented in February 1943. All Allied ground forces opposing Rommel and von Arnim were united into the 18th Army Group, commanded by Gen. Sir Harold R. L. G. Alexander, who set up his headquarters on 20 February at Constantine. Under him were the British First Army, commanded by General Anderson; the French XIX Corps, with General Juin in charge; the U.S. II Corps, headed by General Patton, and the British Eighth Army with General Montgomery as GOC.

On 18 February the Mediterranean Air Command, led by Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder, and including all Allied air forces in the Mediterranean, was organized. The USAAF and RAF components facing Rommel and von Arnim were comprehended in the Northwest African Air Forces under General Spaatz. Under it were Coastal Air Command, headed by Air Marshal H. P. Lloyd and made up of XII Fighter Command and RAF elements; Strategic Air Force, commanded by General Doolittle and  composed of XII Bomber Command and RAF night bombers; and Tactical Air Force, in charge of Air Marshal Sir Arthur Coningham and including the RAF 242 Group and Western Desert Air Force (Embracing USAAF elements), and XII Air Support Command. A Tactical Bomber Force was added on 20 March. Coastal Air Command, composed of general reconnaissance aircraft, bombers, and day and night fighters, was responsible for defense of ports and convoys, and for shipping sweeps and submarine patrols. Strategic Air Force, made up of bombers and long-range fighters, was intended to attack enemy bases and convoys. Tactical Air Force, comprising chiefly fighters and light bombers, was to supply close cooperation with the ground forces. General Eisenhower was in command of all Allied forces in the western Mediterranean, with General Alexander as deputy.

As of 27 February 1943, Coastal Air Force had 162 aircraft assigned. This total included Spitfires, Hurricanes, Beaufighters, Hudsons, Swordfish, and P-39's. Strategic Air Force had 426 B-17'2, B-25's,  B-26's, P-38's, P-40's, and Wellingtons. Under the Tactical Air Force, XII Air Support Command had 178 assigned aircraft, made up of Spitfires, P-39's, and A-20's; while Spitfires, Bisleys, and Hurribombers comprised 242 Group's 184 assigned planes.

The following paragraphs are taken from Tactical Air Force Report on Tunisian Operations:

One of the greatest problems confronting the Tunisian forces in February was the availability and serviceability of landing grounds. In the Northern sector the only suitable area was the valley running east from SOUK-EL-ARBA and SOUK-EL-KHEMIS, ideal for fine weather conditions with ample space for any number of landing grounds, but badly placed amongst high hills for the cloudy winter weather and with heavy soil which went unserviceable on the slightest hint of rain.

There was, however, no alternative, and three landing grounds with all-weather strips were used in this valley at the outset; unserviceability was high and greatly hindered a force operating against enemy air located in open country with reasonable runways. the Sommerfeld tracking was proving of very little value when laid on normal soil, but fortunately some sandy soil was found which provided a foundation and therefore gave reasonable certainty for operations except under heavy rainfall when pools gathered on the landing strip.

In the central sector, high ground and mountains stretched northeast from KASSERINE to PICHON, and the country directly to the west was extremely bad for landing grounds, either from the point of view of flying or of ground serviceability.

To the east the country was open semi-desert, particularly in the THELEPTE area, and most suitable for all weather landing grounds. Farther west, and out of fighter range of the front line, the CANROBERT, and CONSTANTINE plains offered good landing ground facilities for bombers, although unserviceable after heavy rain; also, it was frequently difficult to get clear of the mountains and rendezvous with fighters in open country.

To operate in this area at all successfully, it was vital for the Army to secure the open country to the east of KASSERINE. This was done and throughout the battle these landing grounds at THELEPTE and SBEITLA gave a higher rate of serviceability than any others until settled weather dried up those in the Northern area.

Western Desert had more problems in the MEDENINE area than heretofore, but on the whole landing grounds did not present any problem to them even during the advances to the North, when the serviceability and the available space of the coastal plain remained high throughout. the rapidity of the German retreat from the WADI AKARIT enabled them to use all Axis landing grounds south of ENFIDAVILLE, with only minor extensions and improvements.

the construction program ahead for airfieldds was a heavy one. the air was to provide a semicircle of landing grounds capable of housing the whole tactical fighter and bomber force around the Axis bridgehead, the main centers being SOUK-EL-KHEMIS, LE KEF, KAIROUAN, and the SOUSSE area. The plan could not be put into effect until the enemy were pinned back in the Southern sector, and yet the new airfields had to be prepared to keep step with the advance of the Eighth Army. It was a case of employing all resources to meet requirements at short notice.

Machinery for the construction of landing grounds was a problem in the early stages, but U. S. Aviation Engineers and British airfield construction groups worked in close unison and good will, and on this not the heavy program was carried out according to timetable.

Von Arnim took advantage of the regrouping of units that followed the formation of the 18th Army Group to launch an assault against the British First Army on the northern front. On 26 February several prongs issued from the German lines heading toward Sedjenane, Beja, and Bou Arada, strongly accompanied by dive bombers. the British, caught at a disadvantage, and mustering only inferior numbers, were forced back in three weeks of bitter fighting. A stand was then made despite the heavy rains which had turned the clay roads into sloughs and prohibited the use of motor transport. pack animals had to be used to carry supplies over the precipitous mountain paths. But the hardships were conquered and von Arnim was pushed back by early April practically to his original positions; most important of all, the British retained Medjez-el-Bab, the key to Tunis.

Air cooperation against German attack was more vital than in any other sector, as the enemy was operating from firm bases in Tunis and Bizerte which were capable of rapid reinforcement and had a number of all weather runways. the situation justified 242 Group's maximum effort in compliance with instructions to render full air cooperation with the First Army while the German attack continued. The available forces were nine squadrons of Spitfires, of which only four were on forward landing grounds, one squadron of Hurribombers, and two squadrons of of Mitchells. These forces were employed to the full, the main feature being that fighters were given permission to strafe any moving targets throughout the period. This was necessary because of a shortage of bomber force and unsuitable bombing weather.

Tactical reconnaissance, carried out on a heavy scale, located a large number of targets for the Hurribombers and Spitfires in the battle zone itself; while the medium bombers, operating from the Constantine plain and using the all weather airfield at Tingley, near Bone, attacked communication centers and in particular Mateur. After severe fighting the enemy attack was held, and in March it ceased to be a major threat. During that period 242 Group carried out 3,500 fighter sorties and 250 fighter-bomber sorties, and escorted 160 medium bomber sorties. They destroyed many enemy aircraft and a large number of motor vehicles. the weather was not  suitable for a high rate of interception, nor were the forward control and warning systems fully operational, but by the end of the period the Luftwaffe was under control and attacks on our troops were on a light scale.