Strategic Attacks on Airfields, April 1943

Attacks on enemy airfields by the Strategic Air Force opened with a 4 April assault on Capodichino by 27 B-17's. Next day, strikes were delivered against Bo Rizzo, Bocca di Falco, and Milo. Others followed on Castelvetrano, Decimomannu, Monserrato, Elmas, and Villacidro. The damage was widespread, particularly on parked aircraft. Later in the month repeat attacks were made, and Grosseto and Alghero were added. the Ninth Air Force made one attack on Bari airdrome, covered the field with craters, and set fire to the buildings. The total bombs dropped in April, including those of the Tactical Air Force, were 3,675 tons; previous to April the total tonnage dropped by Northwest African Air Forces was only 2,253 tons.

Naples, Palermo, Messina, Trapani, and of course Tunis and Bizerte were bombed heavily during this period. Wellingtons, preceded by Pathfinders, visited Tunis three times and Bizerte twice. Day bomber attacks on these two ports were hindered by weather, but effective strikes by B-17' were delivered in 18 sorties against Tunis and 27 against Bizerte. Also, Ferryville was hit by 16 B-17's and its docks were badly damaged.

On 4 April Naples received 99 Middle East-based Liberator and 64 B-17 sorties. The Fortresses hit the power and gas plants, barracks, docks, and shipping. Palermo took three attacks from Northwest Africa and five from the Middle East. B-17's flew 95 sorties on the 16th, 17th, and 18th, and hit six ships, the power station, and the marshalling yards. Messina, which had already suffered extensively from Malta-based and Middle East bombers, continued to be scourged,  with the ferry slips as principal targets.  The Fortresses registered direct hits on merchant ships and barges. Other Strategic Air Force missions were directed against Marsala, La Maddalena, and Carloforte.

Complete statistics of Axis vessels sunk or damaged are hard to arrive at, as accounts differ widely without giving the bases of decisions. RAF Middle East Review (no. 3, p.24) states that in April 20 ships were sunk, 16 severely damaged, and 32 damaged; this figure apparently refers to the results of attacks on Axis harbors and at sea, and must apply only to sizeable ships.

General Patton's advance on Gafsa began before General Montgomery's push toward the Mareth Line, but the two movements soon merged into one. On 17 March the U.S. 1st Armored Division defeated the Italian defenders of Gafsa and entered the town. By the 22d, in spite of rainy weather, Maknassy was occupied. Meanwhile the U. S. 1st Infantry Division had advanced beyond El Guettar, and between that point and Maknassy the front was established.

The XII Air Support Command was active in breaking the way, and for the first time light and medium bombers in 18-aircraft formations rendezvoused with fighters and blasted targets. On the 19th a full-dress air attack was commenced by Tactical Bomber Force on Tebaga and Gabes landing grounds, and during the next two days Strategic also delivered maximum-weight strikes. Spitfires covered the returning bombers and spread havoc among pursuing Messerschmitts. Fragmentation bombs were employed, and experiments were conducted to determine the best bombing patterns to use in order to destroy aircraft on the ground. The object of interdicting the use of the Axis air forces against the Eighth Army was almost perfectly attained; in these days only five enemy aircraft appeared over the Eighth Army in offensive roles.

The bombing of German-held southern Tunisian airfields was almost continuous; those well were covered every 15 minutes on the 22d while the Desert Air Force was attacking the Ksar-Rhilane position. By 7 April the enemy had abandoned the forward airdromes, and combined assaults by Tactical and Desert Air Forces soon forced his aircraft out Sfax.

General Montgomery launched his frontal attack on the Mareth Line on the night of 20-21 March, well preceded by night bombers. It took two days to make good the crossing of the Oued Zigzaou, the natural tank obstacle on Rommel's front. Western Desert's full force was utilized in cooperating with the advance by day and night, and it was of great aid in bombing tanks, convoys, and gun positions, and in the general softening-up of the enemy.

The key to General Montgomery's strategy was a "left hook" to Rommel's right near El Hamma, which was delivered by the New Zealand infantry and the British 1st Armored Division. This movement was preceded on 26 March by one of the most intensive and concentrated air cooperation offensives on record up to that time, in an effort to blast a hole through Rommel's panzers.