Air Cooperation With New Zealanders

Since the scene of the projected operation presented navigation difficulties, columns of colored smoke were sent up from landmarks, and the British lines were defined by smoke of a different color. British artillery laid down a creeping barrage which moved forward at the rate of 100 feet per minute, marking the bomb line ahead of the ground advance. The fighter-bombers and light bombers bombed and strafed particular positions on which they were briefed, and the Hurrican tank busters assailed the enemy's armor. Spitfires were flying high cover.

Rommel retreated to a hastily prepared line behind the swollen waters of the Wadi Akarit. An attempted German ground counterattack was nipped in the bud on 6 April by a heavy concentration of bombers and fighter-bombers, though a tank-buster attack on a concentration of armor at Chekira lost heavily because of a ring of mobile flak. That night Rommel's troops left their position and streamed northward. Both the Western Desert Air Force and XII Air Support Command dedicated themselves wholeheartedly to harassing the retreating enemy forces, destroying on the first day alone more than 200 motor vehicles. As the retreat progressed it outran the range of the Western Desert Air Force, and 242 Group now joined XII Air Support Command in the attack. There was little interference from flak or, most of the time, from enemy fighters. Pressure by the U.S. II Corps in the Maknassy area, and by the British IX Corps, forced an acceleration of Rommel's flight by taking Fondouk and threatening Kairouan, which controlled his communications. Sfax and Sousse fell to the Eighth Army, which then broke through Rommel's new position at Enfidavilee on 19 April. The German commander withdrew northward a few miles and dug in, strengthening his position with mine fields.

It was after the beginning of the retreat from the Mareth Line that our offensive against the Axis air transport shuttle service between Sicily and Tunis reached its height. Air transport had made possible the consolidation of German control and had enabled the enemy to offer bitter resistance. Daily traffic between Italy and North Africa was in excess of 100 sorties and rose to a peak of nearly 250. About the middle of March, the Strategic Air Force offered a plan for the suppression of this traffic. The plan's features were:

1. Simultaneous bombing attacks on the main transport landing grounds in Sicily, Italy, and North Africa.

2. P-38 fighter sweeps in the Sicilian Straits at the same time, to catch transport in transit.

3. Spitfire and P-40 sweeps over the landing areas to shoot down any aircraft that got through, and to protect both P-38's and Strategic Air Force bombers by pinning down hostile Africa based fighters which might seek to interfere.

Also, it was planned to let the Axis build up sufficient numbers of transport aircraft so that their would be a serious blow, and to time the attacks with battle progress so that the lack would come when air transport was most needed.

The initial effort came on 5 April. On that day 12 missions were flown by the Strategic Air Force in connection with the transport throttling program, 6 missions by 142 P-38's, 2 by 54 B-25's and 4 by 91 B-17's--a total of287 sorties. Forty enemy planes were shot down in the air, and photographic coverage added enough destroyed on the ground to bring the day's total bag to 201 aircraft. Our losses were 9 shot down and missing. As a bonus, an enemy destroyer was blown up and direct hits were made on 2 other vessels. Transport airdromes at Sidi Ahmed, El Aounia, Bo Rizzo, Bocca di Falco, and Milo were bombed, and on the same day Ninth Air Force B-24's struck at Naples, one of the termini of the shuttle service. On 10 April the operation was repeated on a smaller scale and brought down 45 Ju-52's and 12 fighters. The following day an entire convoy of 21 transports was downed, with 5 of its escorts. A few hours later 5 more transports were annihilated by P-38's.

With the German's southern army in full retreat to Enfidaville the shuttle service took a spurt, and Me-323's were added to Ju-52's; these flew across in large convoys numbering not more than 2 a day, escorted by short-range fighters from both sides. The whole Spitfire and P-40 force of the Western Desert Air Force was now concentrated in an effort to catch these convoys during the fleeting minutes when they could be reached. At last, late in the afternoon of 18 April, about 100 Ju-52's were intercepted, heavily escorted by fighters. Seventy-three transports and 16 fighters were shot down, and some of the rest crash landed on the beach of Cape Bon peninsula. The next morning 12 more transports and 8 escort aircraft were down in ruins; on the 22d, 21 ME-323's were intercepted and all were destroyed, 341 of these in the air, at a cost to us of about 35.

Thereafter the use of enemy air transports was confined to the nights, but with their limited capabilities they failed to accomplish much. During the last night of the campaign, with only two airdromes available to the foe, our fighters further reduced the meager number of arrivals. This campaign to interdict the use of German air transport undoubtedly played an important part in bringing about the enemy's sudden and complete collapse.

The Tactical Air Force came into its own with the beginning of the phase of the campaign wherein the Allied armies pushed on to Bizerte and Tunis for the kill. Since the entire area was within the range of Tactical Air Force planes, the organization was simplified by subordinating XII Air Support Command to 242 Group. The Western Desert Air Force and 242 Group were divided by the Medjerda River, with Western Desert on the south and 242 Group on the north. Headquarters of Tactical Air Force during this period was located at Haidra and later about 18 kilometers southwest of Le Kef. The Tactical Air Force was given four tasks:

1. To destroy the Axis air forces in Tunisia.

2. To disrupt the enemy's supply lines, both by air and by sea.

3. To furnish direct cooperation with ground forces.

4. To prevent another "Dunkerque" by blocking the enemy's escape to Sicily.

Because the Strategic and Coastal Air Forces were involved in carrying out certain aspects of the above program, the following account will not be confined to Tactical's share. Strategic's role should also be borne in mind:

1. To neutralize Axis ports in Sardinia, Sicily, and Italy in order to interdict their use as bases of supply or the reception of evacuated troops.

2. To neutralize Axis airdromes in Sardinia, Sicily, and Italy in order to prevent their use as bases by Axis aircraft which might hamper Allied invasion of Tunisia.

3. To attack Axis air and sea transport wherever found.

4. To begin the softening-up process for the next Allied invasion, that of Sicily.

In preparation for the final assault on von Arnim and Rommel, the U. S. II Corps was moved to the extreme north. The First Army was centered on the key position of Medjez-el-Bab, and the French cleared the hills west of Enfidaville. The Eighth Army remained north of Enfidaville facing Rommel. The plan called for the Americans to drive on Bizerte while the British First Army, reinforced by elements of the Eighth, was to push toward Tunis. The Eighth Army was to engage Rommel and attempt to cut off any move to retreat into the Cape Bon peninsula. These moves were not regarded as easy, for teh enemy's shortened lines enabled him to bring greater force to bear at threatened points.