Tactical Lessons Learned in the Campaign

This account concludes with a summary of tactical lessons learned in the conflict for Tunisia, as set forth in the Northwest African Tactical Air Force Report of Operations in the Tunisian Campaign (Paragraph 1, pp. 13-14):

Cooperation with U. S. forces

1. U. S. and British air forces can work closely together on operational tasks, and units are interchangeable.

2. With mixed U. S. and British air forces it is desirable to have an integrated staff at main headquarters.

3. The trend with U. S. air forces is to make the group the entity; independent squadron identity is suffering in consequence.

4. U. S. tactical reconnaissance squadrons require further training. The tendency to regard reconnaissance as a  secondary task is well developed and should be checked in the training stage.

5. The results achieved in close cooperation bombing by the 47th Bomber Group after a short period of training were up to the highest standard of more experienced squadrons.

6. U. S. point W/T communication requires strengthening. Communications in the Tunisian campaign were both erratic and very slow.

Tactics:

1. Despite its wide dispersal, the German Air Force can be demoralized by the sustained bombardment of its airfields.

2. The exploitation of superior equipment as a surprise measure has a most detrimental effect on enemy morale--e.g., the Spitfire IX in the Tunis battle.

3. The fighter-bomber, with experienced pilots, is a most versatile weapon, and can be readily switched to a variety of targets with confidence--e.g., attacks on shipping and field targets.

4. The efficiency of night bombing is materially increased by the use of pathfinder aircraft.

5. Ground signs put out by the land forces are of the greatest help in close cooperation bombing. This applies in all types of country, except where there exists most definite landmarks which cannot be confused.

6. The day bomber formation operating in the battle area is a very great stimulant to the morale of our ground forces.

7. Except in emergency, low-flying strafing attacks by fighters should not be carried out against an enemy until he is suffering some measure of disorganization.

Airfield construction:

1. Operational airfields used by the German Air Force are of a much lower standard that that required by us.

2. Sommerfeld tracking for an airfield is of little value if laid on a normal surface, as the tracking is soon immersed in mud. If laid on a sandy soil the effect is good. the same remarks apply to Pierce Steel Plank.

3. Tracked airfield (Sommerfeld or Pierce Steel Plank) requires considerable maintenance if in constant use.

4. The Tactical headquarters in the field should be given a measure of control over the aviation engineers or airfield construction groups working on their airfields.

Aircraft:

1. Specialized aircraft--e.g., tank busters--are not an economical striking force. The one tank-buster squadron with the Western Desert Air Force traveled 2,000 miles over a period of four months and operated for approximately one week. by the end of a week the surprise element of their employment had gone and the losses (mostly recoverable aircraft with the pilots unarmed) were very heavy.

2. P-39 aircraft are unsuitable for tactical reconnaissance or as fighters in the battle area.

3. The B-25 is the most acceptable type of tactical bomber for day and night operations with a satisfactory bomb load.

4. The value of the Spitfire IX as a stimulant to morale in fighter is high.

5. The Ju-87 cannot operate without very heavy casualties in a battle area where a resolute fighter defense is established.

Equipment:

1. The U. S. fragmentation cluster is a most effective weapon.

2. The mobile U. S. operations room (S. C. R.) is a well designed and practicable vehicle and very suitable for its task.