Danger from Spain

It was realized the Spanish sympathies were pro-Axis and that the Spanish fascist government hoped to fish in troubled water and catch the control of all or part of French Morocco. This might not be possible without German collaboration, but the whispered suggestion of a projected Allied seizure of Dakar brought forth rumors that in such event Spain might move into French Morocco. Though the Allied ambassadors had assured Franco himself of our determination to respect Spanish neutrality, and though Franco was thought for economic reasons to favor continued neutrality, there was the possibility that German pressure might cause him to throw in his lot openly with the Axis. Already Spain was selling vital supplies to German, and German agents were allowed to operate freely on both sides of the Straits of Gibraltar. For these reasons it was felt by the Allied command that the seizure of Casablanca was a necessary part of the movement into Northwest Africa. Moreover, it would be essential to maintain on the border of Spanish Morocco a force sufficient to meet any invasion which Franco or the Axis might launch.

Planning for the Northwest African invasion began on 18 July 1942, when American and British officers met at a conference at Norfolk House, London, under direction of Lt. Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower. From the first, every effort was made to promote real unity of command, for anything falling short was made to promote real unity of command, for anything falling short of this jeopardized the chances of success in the proposed invasion. To meet this necessity, staff officers were chosen from both nations with regard to their fitness. In some sections national differences in procedure made it necessary to appoint opposite numbers of both nationalities. General Eisenhower was the supreme commander and Adm. Sir Andrew Browne Cunningham was naval commander in chief. The American Twelfth Air Force was under command of Brig. Gen. James H. Doolittle, and the RAF under Air Marshal Sir William Welsh.

The principal snag in planning was struck when it came to deciding upon the focal areas of attack. The invasion would strain Allied resources, which were woefully weak in landing craft, freighters, troopships, and available combat units. The Americans maintained that the Spanish menace dictated landings at Casablanca, to which they were willing to add Oran, but the British favored Oran, Algiers, and if possible Philippeville and Bone; the reasoning was based on the cogent assumption that if Tunisia were to be seized promptly it was necessary to land as close to it as feasible. In the end it was decided to include Casablanca, Oran, and Algiers, but the discussions delayed the movement for about three weeks. It was also decided to modify the American character of the invasion by adding more British combat units in the Algiers area.

The period of a new moon being most favorable for landings, the date of the invasion was set at 7 October. This was later changed to 4 November, and again to 8 November. Casablanca was assigned to the Americans under Maj. Gen. George S. Patton, and the planning for this phase was accomplished chiefly in Washington. The Oran force, also American, was under Maj. Gen. Lloyd R. Fredendall. In order to give an American color to the Algiers force, which was combined British and American, Maj. Gen. Charles W. Ryder was made commander; upon the fall of Algiers the command was to pass to British Lt. Gen. K.A.N. Anderson.

The Oran and Algiers invasions were to occur simultaneously. It was hoped that the Casablanca landing could be made at the same time, but this was rendered problematical by the notorious fact that in the late autumn only one out of five days would be suitable for amphibious operations. The American Navy was to cover Casablanca effort, while the British Navy was to operate in the Mediterranean. In addition, the British provided a strong naval force to watch over the Italian and Vichy French navies, and another to patrol between the Azores and Gibraltar.

American troops at Casablanca and Oran were to unite to guard the border of Spanish Morocco, while General Anderson's British First Army would push on to Tunisia. The Twelfth Air Force was to remain in the west, Casablanca and Oran, while the RAF would cover the British advance.

American diplomats in French North Africa reporting that certain army and air force elements would welcome the coming of Allied forces, a deputation of American officers headed by Maj. Gen. Mark W. Clark landed near Algiers on the night of 22-23 October for a series of conferences. Meanwhile the Americans were negotiating with Gen. Henri Giraud and planned to bring him to Africa in a submarine.