Air Planning of the Invasion

Gen. H. H. Arnold and Maj. Gen. Carl Spaatz agreed that air bombardment from the United Kingdom and air activities based on the Middle East were essential concomitants to any movement into Northwest Africa, and nothing should be allowed to interfere with either. Moreover, the Northwest African venture must be exploited by a build-up of strategic bombers.

Plans had already been made for the activation of the Twelfth Air Force, but it did not appear officially until 20 August 1942, when it was activated at Bolling Field. On 5 September the Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron left New York, landing in Scotland on the 11th. General Doolittle assumed command on 23 September 1942. Prior to that time, personnel were a part of the Eighth Air Force and were known either as Eighth Air Force Junior simply as Junior. General Doolittle arrived in the United Kingdom on 6 August 1942.

On 31 August General Spaatz forwarded to the Commanding General of the European Theater the following points dealing with the timing of the planned operation:

  1. A minimum of three weeks' notice was required to make motor changes, tune planes, pack, crate, and mark equipment, and otherwise to prepare air units for movement from their stations.
  2. it would be impossible to carry out any tactical operations during this period.
  3. Additional time might be needed to replace shortages of equipment. This condition of shortages would probable prevail in the new theater, due to ship sinkings and the fact that supply depots were not yet functioning on a completely effective basis.
  4. Additional time would also be needed for movements to the ports and loadings.

It was proposed that the Casablanca end of the invasion should receive air cooperation from the XII Air Support Command, then being activated and organized in the United States. It would in effect be a miniature air force, with bomber and fighter wings.

The RAF was to accompany the Algiers landing. The main body of the Twelfth Air Force was to proceed from the United Kingdom to Oran, this body to consist of XII Fighter Command and XII Bomber Command, with the addition of the 51st Troop Carrier Wing.

As political and meteorological considerations urged the invasion at the earliest possible date, it was necessary to assign units already trained; to accomplish this, the Eighth Air Force was temporarily all but stripped of units. Staff officers and organizations set apart to reinforce the Ninth Air Force in Egypt were switched to the United Kingdom. In all, the Twelfth Air Force was planned to comprise about 1,500 aircraft and 75,000 men.

Plans called for sending the 33d Fighter Group of P-40's into Casablanca as soon as possible after D-day, and to send the 31st Group of Spitfires to Oran. During the next month other units were to follow as rapidly as preparations could be made to receive them; inevitably there were changes made after D-day in the groups originally scheduled to go.

The air program of the Northwest African invasion consisted of three parts:

  1. XII Air Support Command under Brig. Gen. John K. Cannon accompanied the Western Task Force at Casablanca.
  2. The remainder of the Twelfth Air Force under General Doolittle operated with the Central Task Force at Oran.
  3. The RAF Eastern Air Command under Air Marshal Welsh operated with the Eastern Task Force at Algiers.

In addition, U. S. carrier-based naval aircraft were to cover the initial operations at Casablanca and the British Fleet Air Arm was to cover the other two.

The mission of the air forces was threefold:

  1. To provide air defense and air cooperation with the initial assault forces, and to protect bases and communications as established.
  2. To protect post D-day convoys, the lifeline of the invasion.
  3. To build up an offensive air striking force for strategic bombing of Axis bases and communications, particularly on the continent of Europe.