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Italy
The air plan for the invasion of Italy called for bombing enemy airfields and communications lines, so from August 18 until September 2,
1943, Allied bombers attacked key cities, marshaling yards, harbors,
bridges, and airfields. Allied air leaders also realized that most enemy supplies came down the narrow "boot" of Italy by rail, passing
through
the choke points of Rome, Naples, and Foggia. Raids had already disrupted marshaling yards at Rome and Naples. On August 19, U.S. and British
heavy bombers struck Foggia. They cut lines to Naples, Manfredonia, and Bari; hit yards, nearby factories, and rolling stock; and wrecked electric
substations. The airmen returned on August 25 to strafe and bomb the
Foggia airfield complex with more than two hundred P-38s and B-17s.
These attacks crippled enemy communications and proved invaluable to
the success of the invasion of Italy.
The British Eighth Army crossed the Strait of Messina on September
3 and landed on the "toe" of Italy. Opposition proved slight as the Germans began a slow withdrawal. Six days later, following the Allied
announcement of Italy's surrender, previously negotiated in secret, a British
division landed at Taranto on Italy's "heel." That same day, the U.S. Fifth
Army, commanded by Lt. Gen. Mark W. Clark, assaulted the beaches at
Salerno, less than fifty miles south of Naples on Italy's western coast.
Amid a hail of German artillery, mortar, and machine-gun fire that
extended from the beaches to the transports, U.S. troops went ashore and
pressed inland. Meanwhile, in response to the Italian surrender and determined to defend the peninsula, the Germans moved their forces south to
occupy their former Axis partner's territory.
Using P-38s, A-36s, and Spitfires, the XII Air Support Command
provided continuous air cover over the invasion area. Behind the beaches,
airmen hoped to isolate the battlefield by cutting roads, rail lines, and
bridges, but enough German reinforcements got through to contain the
Salemo bridgehead. Elements of four Panzer divisions raced to the scene,
and, on September 12, they launched a heavy counterattack designed to
slice Clark's army in half and push it into the sea. Within two days, the enemy drove a deep and dangerous wedge into the Allied front, at one point
coming within a thousand yards of the beach.
NAAF responded to the crisis by throwing its strength fully into the
fight. Heavy and medium bombers attacked roads and junctions to isolate
the battlefield; fighter-bombers flew hundreds of missions in direct support of the troops; and, finally, troop carriers brought in paratroopers who
conducted three drops between September 13 and 15. The bombing was a
spectacular success. Airmen obliterated roads, wiped out troop and motor
transport concentrations, and wrecked rail lines. Stunned by its heavy
losses, the enemy began pulling back on September 16. The U.S. Fifth
Army now prepared to go on the offensive.

While the Fifth and Eighth Armies readied for their move up the
peninsula, Allied airmen again struck Foggia, shattering the airfield complex and wrecking close to three hundred enemy aircraft. These losses,
combined with earlier maulings over Tunisia and Sicily, forced the Germans to surrender local air superiority as they withdrew bombers and
fighters either into central and northern Italy or back to Germany. For the
remainder of September, as the Allies edged toward Naples and Foggia,
their air forces mercilessly bombed and strafed the retreating Germans.
Again and again, NAAF airmen pressed home their attacks. They blocked
road junctions and other bottlenecks north and east of Naples; destroyed
bridges at Lagonegro, Avellino, and Capua; shot up troops and trucks
ahead of advancing Allied columns; and left railway spans impassable at
Formia and Pescara. Under this sustained pounding, German resistance
softened-a welcome outcome for the U.S. Army as it pushed slowly
northward across the mountains toward Naples.
After a tough fight, Clark's Fifth Army poured onto the Naples plain
and liberated the city on October 1. Meanwhile, with negligible interference from the Luftwaffe, the British Eighth Army captured Foggia's
airfields and occupied the entire Gargano peninsula. With these victories,
the Allies now held Naples, Bari, and Taranto-three of Italy's best ports
and two of its most important air centers.
As 1943 drew to a close, Allied leaders, including
Roosevelt, Churchill, and Chinese leader Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek,
and their top military advisors met at Cairo, Egypt, to plan future
strategy. They created the Mediterranean Allied Air Forces (MAAF) to
control all theater air units and approved a U.S. proposal for an air
force-the Fifteenth Air Force, based in the Mediterranean-to join
in the strategic bombing of Germany. To coordinate activities of the
veteran Eighth Air Force, operating against Germany from England, and
the new Fifteenth Air Force, assembling in southern Italy, Allied
leaders established the United States Strategic Air Forces in Europe (USSTAF).
As part of the reorganization, Arnold sent Spaatz to England to command
USSTAF. He also gave Doolittle the Eighth Air Force and moved Lt. Gen.
Ira C. Eaker from England to head the MAAF.

Meanwhile, the Luftwaffe
remained active. German airmen attacked Allied bomber formations, repeatedly raided La Maddalena harbor in Sardinia, and struck shipping off
Naples and across the Mediterranean at Benghazi. During the night of December 2/3, approximately thirty German aircraft pounded Bari and blew
up two ammunition ships in the harbor. The resulting explosions destroyed
an additional seventeen vessels and closed the port for three weeks.
To reduce the Luftwaffe's threat, airmen of the MAAF hunted the enemy in the air and on the ground. They also teamed with Allied ground
forces to bomb and strafe German troops approaching the front and to fly
interdiction missions against roads and bridges. Meanwhile, a new strategic air force loomed on the horizon.
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