Bombing Behind Enemy Lines

At the outbreak of the Second World War, the United States Army Air Forces (AAF) already possessed a broad strategic plan, designated AWPD–1, for an aerial offensive against Germany. Prepared by the Air War Plans Division in July 1941 at the request of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, the plan’s first priority was to attain air superiority by destroying the German aircraft industry and operational fighters. The second priority
was to destroy the German electrical power grid, transportation network, and oil industry. When these objectives were accomplished, the AAF would provide direct tactical support for the ground invasion of Europe. 

The story of the AAF in Europe is largely one of the struggle to successfully apply the broad precepts of AWPD–1 to operational realities. The Americans first constructed a logistical infrastructure in England to sustain the strategic bombardment of occupied Europe and Germany. The AAF and the Royal Air Force (RAF) then launched a combined bomber offensive, striking the enemy day and night. By the spring of 1944, the AAF had accumulated enough heavy bombers and long-range escorts to achieve air superiority. With the invasion of Normandy imminent, the air arm turned its attention to the tactical support of ground forces breaching the Atlantic wall. With Fortress Europe’s westernmost barrier penetrated, the AAF continued to bombard Germany’s few remaining strategic targets and to support Allied ground troops until the surrender of Nazi Germany in April 1945. 

The AAF began to implement AWPD–1 as soon as the United States entered the war in December 1941. Almost immediately, Allied military leaders started to amass forces in the United Kingdom, with an eventual goal of invading Nazi-occupied Europe. As part of the buildup known as Bolero, the War Department ordered the Eighth Air Force to the United Kingdom. Comprising the VIII Bomber Command, the VIII Fighter Command, the VIII Air Support Command, and the VIII Service Command, the Eighth Air Force was dedicated from its establishment to the strategic bombardment of Germany.

As the American air units began to arrive in Britain, RAF and AAF leaders disputed the proper role of heavy bombers. The Americans wanted to conduct daylight precision bombing. The RAF leaders pointed out that they had flown daylight missions early in the war, but switched to night missions to curtail heavy losses. Based on their experience, the British were confident that nighttime area bombing was the most effective way to employ heavy bombers and invited the AAF to join them in their effort.

Maj. Gen. Carl A. Spaatz, commander of the Eighth Air Force, and Brig. Gen. Ira C. Eaker, commander of the VIII Bomber Command, disagreed vehemently with the British. They argued that the only way to achieve air superiority over Europe was to force the Luftwaffe to fight in the daytime. After the Luftwaffe had been defeated, the heavy bombers could cripple the enemy by destroying the electrical power network, petroleum industry, and other strategic targets listed in AWPD–1. At this point, Spaatz was confident that strategic bombardment could defeat the Germans without an invasion, but first the United States had to demonstrate that American airmen could carry out accurate, daylight bombing missions without heavy losses.