Hansell—A Vulnerable Commander

Even with the new bases in the Marianas, the XXI Bomber Command’s B–29s had little success against Japan during late 1944 and early 1945. The Superfortresses continued to suffer mechanical problems. (Hansell’s own airplane had to abort during San Antonio I.) The extreme range placed still more demands on the aircraft. Formation flying and the 3,000-mile round-trip to Japan consumed enormous quantities of fuel. The very long distances precluded land-based escort, so the B–29s flew at altitudes of up to 35,000 feet, beyond the reach of most Japanese interceptors. The climb consumed even more fuel. At extremely high altitudes, jet stream winds around Japan blew the bombers and bombs off course. Tailwinds pushed the Superfortresses so fast over their targets that there was no time to drop the bombs accurately. Headwinds slowed the bombers, increasing their vulnerability to antiaircraft defenses or fighters and eating up fuel. Clouds often obscured targets, and tropical storms were common. 

During the first weeks on Saipan, Hansell also lacked enough aircraft to mount effective strategic missions. Larger formations could compensate in part for lack of precision, covering more area with bombs and increasing the chances of hitting a target. By mid-January 1945, two full B–29 wings were based in the Marianas. 

Iwo Jima, a small island between Japan and the Marianas, was a continual sore point for the United States. From there, enemy aircraft often raided the Superfortress bases or attacked the formations heading to or from Japan. Sacrificing guns and bullets for speed and altitude, the desperate Japanese fighters sometimes rammed the giant bombers. Enemy radar on Iwo Jima also warned the Japanese home islands of impending Superfortress raids. 

Hansell’s own resistance to his superiors’ demands for area incendiary bombing also contributed to his fall. Fire raids dated back to July 1943 when the Royal Air Force had ignited a firestorm in Hamburg. After the successful December 1944 fire raid by the India-based XX Bomber Command against Hankow, China, Twentieth Air Force Chief of Staff Brig. Gen. Lauris Norstad directed Hansell to launch similar fire raids against Japan from the Marianas. Hansell, who had devoted much of his life to selective targeting and precision bombing doctrine, reluctantly sent an incendiary raid against Nagoya on January 3, 1945. The raid failed to achieve the level of destruction Arnold and Norstad desired. By mid-January, Arnold was exasperated by Hansell’s caution, delays, and lack of results. Before the successful Akashi raid, Arnold had already decided to replace Hansell with LeMay. 

Hansell’s dismissal obscured his achievement in pioneering the XXI Bomber Command’s strategic campaign against Japan from the Marianas. Stressing precision daylight raids over night bombing with radar, Hansell improved bombing accuracy after a determined struggle. He increased the percentage of bombers reaching their targets and returning to their home bases. At the time of his dismissal, his 73d Bombardment Wing in Saipan had been joined by the 313th on Tinian, and the 314th was on the way to Guam. Hansell oversaw the stationing of these new wings. Most important, he set in motion the repeated bombing of industries in Tokyo and other Japanese cities that were beyond the reach of the B–29 bases in Asia. In fact, his performance with the XXI Bomber Command in the Marianas compared favorably with that of the XX Bomber Command in the China-Burma-India theater. But Arnold, determined to knock Japan out of the war prior to an Allied invasion, expected a significantly better performance from the Marianas.