INTRODUCTION

The Allied invasion of France on June 6, 1944, signaled the certain end to Adolf Hitler’s Third Reich. Six days later, a German pilotless aircraft bomb—designated as the V–1—flew across the English Channel and dropped on central London. That these two events happened in that order within the same week was no coincidence: starting in December 1943, the Allies had diverted a substantial portion of their total war effort to ensure that whatever threat Hitler’s V-weapons posed to the Allies would be delayed until after the invasion.

Allied intelligence had revealed in late 1942 the existence of two new German weapons. One was a flying torpedo, a jet-powered aircraft launched from a ground-based catapult or from another aircraft. It flew at roughly 360 mph with a range of about 150 miles. The torpedo could deliver 1,870 pounds of high explosive. Today we call this weapon a “cruise missile,” ground-, air-, or sea-launched.

The second weapon was a long-range artillery shell. Launched on land from a fixed or mobile platform, this rocket-powered ballistic missile could reach supersonic speeds (3,355 mph) nine times faster than the flying torpedo, at altitudes as high as 50 miles, and then travel ballistically with a range of 150 miles to strike with 1,650 pounds of high explosive at a preprogrammed target area. Fired from northern France or from the Low Countries, these missiles could hit large targets like London.

Together, these devices were called V-weapons. Less precise than manned bombers, they were not accurate enough to threaten military targets. What made them a threat was their potential against civilian targets —the terror bombing of cities. Unlike the jet-powered V–1, which was vulnerable to tactical defense, the supersonic V–2 struck swiftly and without warning. Allied leaders did not know what kinds of warheads the V-weapons might carry and had to prepare for the worst possibilities, including unusually powerful explosives, poison gas, or perhaps even biological or nuclear weapons.

In late 1943, the best defense against the V–2 seemed to be a good offense: capture the V–2s with ground troops, push enemy launchers out of range as Allied troops advanced, or destroy the weapons before they were launched. The first two methods depended on the success of the D-Day invasion, and in the interim the Allies determined to strike often and hard at whatever V-targets appeared.

The decision to divert air power resources to finding and destroying V-weapon assembly facilities and storage and launching sites, and for poststrike assessment, was controversial. Some believed the V-weapon threat an elaborate hoax to draw Allied air power away from bombing Germany. Others thought the aerial response, Operation CROSSBOW, was a waste of time, planes, and men that could be better spent in strategic bombing of enemy territory. Those who favored V-weapon targeting had a more subtle argument. In the air war over Europe, morale and politics played a major role along with the strategy of destroying the enemy’s industry. British leaders were appalled to realize that London could still be a target of German bombardment when the Allies had all but achieved air superiority. Thus, the aerial campaign against the V-weapons was made a top priority and continued so until Allied troops pushed the enemy out of range.